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A PRECEPT OF MANAGERIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: SECURING
COLLECTIVE JUSTICE IN
INSTITUTIONAL
REFORM LITIGATION
By Anthony M. Bertelli and Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.*

Institutional reform litigation confronts public administrators

with troubling dilemmas. Plaintiffs routinely accuse public officials
of violating their constitutional rights.' Federal judges order offi-

cials to make sweeping changes to their agencies.2

Of course,

sometimes, as-with the school desegregation cases,3 federal courts
have had no choice but to be heavy-handed4 with public officials.

Yet court directives often contradict the duties and responsibilities
of public managers. The argument for judicial intervention is
rarely straightforward.
* Anthony M. Bertelli is an assistant professor at the James W. Martin School of
Public Policy and Administration at the University of Kentucky. Laurence E. Lynn,
Jr. is the Sidney Stein, Jr. Professor of Public Management at the Irving B. Harris
Graduate School of Public Policy Studies and the School of Social Service Administration at the University of Chicago. The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful
comments of Phillip Cooper, Colin Diver, Craig Levine, David Rosenbloom, Ellen
Schall, and Charles Wise.
1. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681 (1978) (alleging that conditions of
Arkansas prisons violated the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments); Hills v. Gatreaux,
425 U.S. 284, 287 (1976) (alleging violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Chicago Housing
Authority in intentionally allocating housing in a discriminatory manner).
2. See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 686-88 (upholding the trial court's remedial order imposing new standards on the state's use of solitary confinement); Hills, 425 U.S. at 299
(ordering the agencies to create housing alternatives beyond the city limits of
Chicago).
3. See, e.g., Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683, 689 (1963) (invalidating
"one-way transfers," allowing students to transfer to schools in which they belonged
to a racial majority group); Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 441-42
(1968) (invalidating a similar "freedom of choice" provision).
4. We acknowledge that "heavy-handedness" on the part of the trial judge may
be the result of the particularities of the case. Parties often ask the judge to make
orders when they are unable to come to a resolution, and appellate decisions may
confine judges to a set of orders that are not what even they consider remedially
adequate. See, e.g., PHILLIP J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES 105-35 (1988);
Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 394-95 (1982).
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Consider the case of Marisol A. v. Guiliani.5 The case was filed
in the Southern District of New York in 1995, shortly after the
widely publicized death of Eliza Izquierdo. New York City Child
Welfare Administration ("CWA") officials had placed Izquierdo, a
six-year old child, in foster care. The CWA later returned Izquierdo to her mother. Despite receiving numerous reports of the
mother's subsequent abuse, CWA took no further action on Izquierdo's file. Izquierdo was subsequently beaten to death by her
mother. Catalyzed by Izquierdo's death, children's rights advocates sued CWA, claiming the agency failed to protect children at
risk of being placed in foster homes. The lawsuit was based on
various New York and federal statutes6 and the New York and federal constitutions.7
Four weeks after the Marisol complaint was filed, Mayor Rudolph W. Guiliani announced his own program to reform the City's
child welfare program:
Following the shocking death of Elisa Izquierdo, a child under
the protection of the City's Child Welfare Administration, New
York City Mayor Rudolph Guiliani initiated a sharp departure
from the status quo. He separated the child welfare administration from the Human Resources Administration and created, by
Executive Order No. 26 in January 1996, a new agency, [Administration for Children's Services ("ACS)"], that would report directly to him rather than through a deputy mayor, as is the case
with other cabinet departments. To head the new agency, the
Mayor appointed Nicholas Scoppetta as Commissioner and
promised him the full financial and operational support of his
administration. These moves were intended to insure that "business as usual" in child welfare services could not continue in
New York City.8
5. Marisol v. Guiliani, 929 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
6. The plaintiffs' statutory claims included violations of the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679a (2001); the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5151-06a (2001); the Medicare Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396(a), 1396(d)(A), 1396(d)(R); the Americans With Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12101; § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794, 794a
(2001); Articles 2, 3, 6, and 7 of the New York Social Services Law; Articles 6 and 10
of the New York State Family Court Act, N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§ 611, 1011 (McKinney
1999); and New York State Administrative Regulations at N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &
Regs., tit. 18, § 400-484 (2001).
7. The plaintiffs' constitutional claims included violations of the First, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and violation of Article
XVII of the New York State Constitution.
8. LAURENCE E. LYNN, JR., THE MANAGEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION FOR
CHILDREN'S SERVICES

(ACS):

AN ASSESSMENT 9

(1998).
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Marisol v. Guilianiwas ultimately settled without a provision for
federal court oversight. The judge only required that a panel of
national experts review the agency's reform efforts for two years. 9
If within that time, ACS made good faith efforts towards reforming
its operation, the lawsuit would not be reinstated."0
The case raises a larger question. Should a state's interest in the
exercise of managerial discretion on behalf of legislated goals
weigh in a court's determination if a human services agency has
violated constitutional rights?11 Under what circumstances should
federal courts allow public administrators to manage their own
agencies? How should state and local public administrators answer
for their performance so as to justify this judicial restraint?
We argue that federal courts should refuse to hear institutional
reform cases not only when federal court intervention would upset
a state administrative scheme (the traditional Burford abstention
doctrine), z but also when the institutional defendant is governed
by a precept of managerial responsibility.3 When the agency's
challenged actions have comported with this precept, we urge federal courts to let their state counterparts determine the agency's
managerial responsibility in a common law process.
The analysis begins, in Part I, by addressing the Burford abstention arguments in the Marisol case itself. In Part II, we turn to the
application of abstention doctrines to institutional reform litigation
9. Rachel Swarns, Guiliani Agrees to Independent Oversight of Child Welfare
Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1998, at Al.
10. Id.
11. In some ways, the question has been squarelyaddressed. The United States
Supreme Court has dealt with this difficult question in the context of prison detention
methods in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979):
The Government ...has legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained .... For example, the
Government must be able to take steps to maintain security and order at the
institution and make certain no weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees. Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining
jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional
punishment ....
In this article, we provide a generalized "attempt to detail the precise extent of the
legitimate governmental interests" of public human service agencies.
12. The Burford doctrine, formulated in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 318
(1943), is a doctrine of abstention where "federal courts have refrained from interfering with complex state regulatory schemes." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 197 (6th ed.
1990).
13. See generally Arthur A. Maas & Laurence I. Radway, Gauging Administrative
Responsibility, in IDEAS AND ISSUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: A BOOK OF
READINGS 440 (Dwight Waldo ed., 1953) (discussing criteria to determine if an administrative agency's conduct is responsible).
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generally, and Marisol in particular. In Parts III and IV, we justify
these abstention doctrines on grounds of federalism and the professionalism of public administrators. In Part V, we propose a test
federal judges may use to decide whether to abstain from an institutional reform litigation case. In Part II, we derive the basis for
this test -

our precept of managerial responsibility -

from the

intellectual history of the concept of responsibility in public
administration.
I.

ABSTENTION IN MARISOL

A. v. GUILIANI

In Marisol A. v. Guiliani,the federal district court dismissed the
child welfare agency's motion urging the court to abstain under the
Burford abstention doctrine. The Burford doctrine permits a federal court to relinquish jurisdiction in order to avoid unnecessary
conflict with a state's internal administration. The agency argued
that the district court should have avoided interfering with the
child welfare policy of New York City. 4 The agency claimed that
Burford abstention was proper because "a federal ruling could conflict with [New York's] administrative scheme, and the area of child
welfare services is an area of substantial state concern.' 15
The court rejected this motion, reasoning that Burford abstention was not appropriate. According to the court, the plaintiffs did
not ask the court to interfere with or change the underlying policies
of the agency. Instead, the court reasoned, the plaintiffs had asked
14. Plaintiffs' claims were that ACS failed to take the following actions:
(1) appropriately accept reports of abuse and neglect for investigation; (2)
investigate those reports in the time and manner required by law; (3) provide mandated preplacement preventive services to enable children to remain at home whenever possible; (4) provide the least restrictive, most
family-like placement to meet children's individual needs; (5) provide services to ensure that children do not deteriorate physically, psychologically,
educationally, or otherwise while in CWA custody; (6) provide children with
disabilities, including HIV/AIDS, with appropriate placements; (7) provide
appropriate case management or plans that enable children to return home
or be discharged to permanent placements as quickly as possible; (8) provide
services to assist children who are appropriate for adoption in getting out of
foster care; (9) provide teenagers adequate services to prepare them to live
independently once they leave the system; (10) provide the administrative,
judicial, or dispositional reviews to which children are entitled; (11) provide
caseworkers with training, support, or supervision; and (12) maintain adequate systems to monitor, track, and plan for children.
Marisol, 929 F. Supp. at 669-72.
15. Id.
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the court to ensure agency compliance with an existing administrative and statutory scheme.' 6
The court recognized that the Burford doctrine was intended to
keep federal courts from interfering with state efforts to develop,
effect, and enforce state policy. 17 Although the court agreed that
child welfare is an area of substantial state concern, the court refused to abstain since the plaintiffs asked the court to ensure
agency compliance with an existing administrative and statutory
scheme. 18 We disagree. What exactly had the plaintiffs'
requested?
The Marisol plaintiffs claimed New York's child welfare agency
had mishandled its cases in violation of the Federal and State Constitutions, federal and state statutes, and state administrative regulations. The plaintiffs requested injunctive and declaratory relief. 19
Furthermore, plaintiffs' requested that the court appoint a receiver
to oversee the injunctive relief, restructure the child welfare system, and ensure the agency's compliance with all applicable law.2"
This drastic relief was sought against an agency that Mayor
Guiliani had only recently restructured. 21 There is no plausible
way the court could "ensure agency compliance with an existing
administrative and statutory scheme '2 2 without interfering with the
scheme, embodied by the new ACS itself, that Mayor Guiliani had
created - a scheme that had not been given the opportunity to
show its potential for effective child welfare administration.
One of the defendants' experts described the easily-misunderstood context in which ACS functions:
From a child advocate's perspective, from the perspective of
Children's Rights, Inc., for example, the relevant "unit of analysis" and focus of concern for an agency such as ACS is the indi16. 929 F. Supp. at 687-88.
17. Id.
18. Id.

19. These included the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution; Article XVII of the New York State Constitution; the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 620-28, 670-79a (2001); the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5151-06a (2001); the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396(a), 1396(d)(A), 1396(d)(R) (2001); the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2001); § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 794, 794a (2001); Articles 2, 3, 6, and 7 of the New York Social Services
Law; Articles 6 and 10 of the New York State Family Court Act, N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act
§§ 611, 1011 (McKinney 1999); and New York State Administrative Regulations at 18
N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs., tit. 18, §§ 400-484 (2001).
20. Marisol, 929 F. Supp. at 672.
21. 929 F. Supp. at 669 n.1.
22. 929 F. Supp. at 687.
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vidual child, the individual case. The goal of advocates is the
treatment of each and every case in accordance with an uncompromised moral. imperative: every child must be protected with
skill, good judgment, and utter humanity so that no mistakes are
made, no child is lost, no harm is done, ever ....An idealistic
world view of mistake-free administration may be held up as a
goal to strive for, but cannot be taken as a realistic standard for
23
assessing the competence of management.
The Marisol court could not, in granting the injunctive relief requested by plaintiffs, avoid interfering with state efforts to develop
state policy. 24 To accept such a responsibility is to embrace the

"idealistic world view of mistake-free administration,"' 25 which
ACS, as an executive agency, could not practically achieve under
any circumstance.
II.

ABSTENTION DOCTRINES: WHY BURFORD

Is

PROPER

The U.S. Supreme Court has carved out three doctrines permitting federal courts to abstain from adjudicating claims over which
they have proper jurisdiction.26 The Pullman doctrine, named for
the Supreme Court's decision in Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman Co.,27 suggests a federal court must avoid deciding a federal constitutional question when the case can be disposed of on
state law grounds. -8 Pullman abstention is not proper when a case
involves a nonconstitutional federal issue that can be resolved by
deciding an underlying state law issue. In such cases, federal courts
should decide both the federal and state law issues.2 9 Such situations invoke the Supremacy Clause, and transform the case into an
interpretation of federal law alone.30 Thus, Pullman abstention is
not proper in a case like Marisol, where the plaintiffs relied on federal statutory claims.
A second abstention doctrine arose in Younger v. Harris,where
the Supreme Court held that federal courts are not permitted, except in extreme instances, to interfere with state criminal prosecu23. LYNN, supra note 8, at 10.
24. Marisol, 929 F. Supp at 688.
25. LYNN, supra note 8, at 10.
26. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988) (citation omitted).

27. Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
28. CHARLES WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(2d ed. 1988).

2D §

4241

29. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 490 (1949).
30. See United States Auto Ass'n v. Muir, 792 F.2d 356, 363-64 (3d Cir. 1986).
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tions. 31 The Court later extended the reach of Younger abstention
to situations where federal claims were or could have been

presented in an ongoing state judicial proceeding dealing with an
important state interest. 32 In Marisol, the child welfare agency unsuccessfully argued that issues regarding its compliance with state
and federal statutes could have been heard by the family courts of
New York State.33 The court rejected this argument, reasoning

that none of the plaintiffs were improperly challenging a state
court proceeding through the federal courts.3 4 Apparently, the fact

that the plaintiff did not have an ongoing case against the agency in
a New York state court was dispositive. We will not challenge the
court's loosely reasoned holding on the Younger issue,35 since a
31. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
32. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1984).
33. Marisol, 929 F. Supp. at 689.
34. Id.
35. In J.B. by Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 1999), the Tenth Circuit
reviewed a New Mexico district court's decision to abstain under Younger in a structural reform suit against New Mexico's child welfare agency. The question at issue
was whether there was an ongoing state judicial proceeding where the plaintiffs had
an adequate opportunity to raise their federal claims. 186 F.3d at 1291. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the abstention. The court noted that plaintiffs were subject to biannual review hearings before the New Mexico Children's Court. "These proceedings,
while admittedly less than full adversarial hearings, are judicial in nature. Moreover,
they exist as long as the child remains in state custody, so they are ongoing." 186 F.3d
at 1291. Furthermore, the court found that
plaintiffs' federal action would interfere with this proceeding by fundamentally changing the dispositions and oversight of the children. The federal
court would, in effect, assume an oversight role over the entire state program for children with disabilities. This places the federal court in the role
of making dispositional decisions such as whether to return the child to his
parents in conjunction with state assistance or whether to modify a treatment plan.
186 F.3d at 1291-92. Finally, the court noted that
we are less certain about whether they could have adequately raised their
federal statutory and constitutional claims in these state proceedings. This
uncertainty, however, militates in favor of abstention .... Plaintiffs bear the
burden of proving that state procedural law barred presentation of their
claims in the New Mexico Children's Court .... In this case, plaintiffs have
failed to clearly show that they could not have raised their claims during the
periodic review proceedings.
186 F.3d at 1292 (citations omitted).
Judge Briscoe dissented on the Younger question. Concerning the holding that the
federal court was justified in not intervening in a state proceeding, he wrote:
As did the district court, the majority in essence assumes Younger precludes
the coexistence of federal and state suits involving abused or neglected children in the custody of the State of New Mexico. This sweepingly broad rule
would bar any abused or neglected child in State custody from obtaining
federal court access to vindicate violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights. For any such child, a Children's Court proceeding would al-
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third abstention doctrine, also rejected by the court, fits the
Marisol case more appropriately.
That doctrine originated in the Supreme Court's decision in Burford v. Sun Oil, Co.36 The Burford doctrine was aptly summarized
by the Supreme Court in New Orleans v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.:
Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a
federal court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the
proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies: (1) when
there are 'difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance tranways be pending or ongoing. The appropriateness of abstention, however,
turns neither on the mere availability of a state judicial forum nor on the
existence of parallel federal and state court proceedings ... Younger abstention springs from notions of comity, federalism, and respect for state sovereignty, and turns on whether a federal court is called upon to interfere in a
state judicial process. The healthiest respect for this rule does not dictate
abstention here. Numerous federal courts have exercised jurisdiction over
similarly broad child welfare cases, many of them expressly finding Younger
abstention inappropriate notwithstanding the presence of periodic reviews in
state family courts.
186 F.3d at 1295 (Briscoe, J. concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted). Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's view of the state proceeding as ongoing and
flatly denied the ability of a dispositional hearing to provide a forum for plaintiffs'
claims:
The purpose of the periodic dispositional reviews is not to determine a state
official's compliance with federal laws mandating the provision of specific
services, or the constitutional adequacy of New Mexico's entire service delivery system, but rather to reassess the Children's Court's previous determinations regarding custody and treatment. These determinations are intensely
individual, focusing only on the child and his or her family or guardian. The
nature of the proceedings does not permit a prolonged, critical, and adversarial examination of the gamut of services being provided to a child in state
custody. Moreover, many procedural safeguards that are present in a typical
adversarial proceeding, and that are designed to ensure fundamental fairness
and the reliability of admitted evidence, are noticeably absent in Children's
Court hearings. For example, the court itself is not required to conduct the
review hearing, but may designate that task to a special master, who in turn
submits recommendations to the court. And, although evidence may be
presented and witnesses cross-examined at the hearing, discovery is limited
and the rules of evidence do not apply. The Children's Court is not suited to
adjudicate the complex constitutional, statutory, and systemic claims raised
by plaintiffs.
186 F.3d at 1296 (citations omitted).
We circumvent Younger because it is less applicable, in our view, than the doctrine of
Burford abstention discussed below. As the debate in the Tenth Circuit clearly shows,
Younger is problematic in child welfare institutional reform scenarios. However,
Judge Ward's opinion does not address these serious issues in foregoing Younger
abstention.
36. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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scends the result in the case then at bar'; or (2) where the 'exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar
cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent
37
policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.'
The Supreme Court recently stated that Burford abstention is
not limited to cases in equity, but rather extends to all cases where
a federal court is asked to provide discretionary relief.3" Regarding
the second part of the Burford test, where federal review would
disrupt state efforts to establish a coherent policy in an area of substantial public concern, 39 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that there are
two fundamental elements of Burford abstention. First, and
most obvious, the state must offer some forum in which claims
may be litigated ....

Second, that forum must be special, it must

stand in a special relationship of technical oversight or concentrated review in the evaluation of those claims. The ability to
point to a specialized proceeding is a prerequisite of, not a factor in, the second type of Burford abstention. a
Burford doctrine provides courts with wide latitude to abstain in
a given case. The Supreme Court in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, however, muddied its potential applicability by describing the doctrine as a narrow exception to the
exercise of federal jurisdiction. 4 1 The doctrine does not seem to

apply to cases in which federal preemption is shown, although
there is no per se rule against applying Burford in such cases.42
Moreover, even where no state law claim can be found in the case
at bar, abstention may be proper because the motive behind Burford is not the desire to avoid a state law question, but the reluctance to intrude into a complex state regulatory system. a3
Courts have disagreed over Burford's breadth:
37. New Orleans v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)).
38. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728 (1996).
39. New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 361.
40. Prop. and Cas. Ins., Ltd. v. Cent. Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 936 F.2d 319, 323
(7th Cir. 1991).
41. See William E. Ryckman, Jr., Land Use Litigation: FederalJurisdiction and the
Abstention Doctrines, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 377, 411-12 (1981).
42. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 798 F.2d 858, 862 n.1
(5th Cir. 1986). Federal preemption refers to areas of law where states may not legis-

late in a manner inconsistent with existing federal law.
1177 (6th ed. 1990).
43. New Orleans, 798 F.2d at 862 n.1.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
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Some courts apply Burford only when the facts are analogous to
the Burford case. Others interpret Burford as a general mandate to exercise caution when decisions will impact on issues of
local concern. Some courts appear so baffled by the distinction
between Pullman and Burford that they apply the doctrines in
aggregate form.

4

We argue that such difficulties in Burford's application stem
from an attempt to understand it solely on grounds of comity and
federalism. Deference to administrative professionalism in public
management provides a third justification as well as some clarification. 45 Part IV unpacks this rationale in its explication of the precept of managerial responsibility.
Burford abstention may be raised by the court on its own motion
if the court finds such action is warranted.4 6 If a court abstains,
three dispositions of the case are possible. The case may be dismissed, as is typical, with no retention of jurisdiction.4 7 The court
may also order a stay to be vacated only if the state proceeding
cannot reach a prompt, final determination on the merits.4 8 Third,
given the Supreme Court's holding in Carnegie-Mellon University
v. Cohill,49 the court may be able to remand the case to the state
court for reasons other than lack of jurisdiction.
Courts have found Burford abstention proper in several key instances. In Canaday v. Koch, 50 a case cited by the Marisol court,51
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (the
same court as that deciding Marisol) adjudicated a lawsuit brought
by homeless mothers against New York City for denying them
emergency housing. The district court abstained under Burford,
finding that since the case involved a question of substantial local
interest, the decision of which would disrupt local remedial efforts,
the Burford test was easily satisfied:
The problem of New York City's homeless is one of predominantly local concern. State law regarding governmental obliga44. Julie A. Davies, Pullman and Burford Abstention: Clarifying the Rules of State
and Federal Courts in Constitutional Cases, 20 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1, 16 (1986).

45. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
46. Urbano v. Bd. of Managers of N. J. State Prison, 415 F.2d 247, 254 n.20 (3d
Cir. 1969).

47. See generally Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
48. WRIGHT, supra note 28, § 4245; Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S.
593, 594 (1968).
49. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
50. Canaday v. Koch, 608 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 768 F.2d 501 (2d Cir.
1985).
51. Marisol, 929 F. Supp. at 687-88.
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tions to the destitute homeless is unsettled and unclear. Local
officials are still endeavoring to formulate and effect a coherent
policy for providing shelter for the homeless. Obviously, federal
court intervention in this area would interfere with those efforts.
Allocation of resources for welfare programs is a task uniquely
within the sphere of local control. Placing that task under the
supervision of this court is fraught with dangers. This court has
no particular expertise in structuring welfare programs, or allocating scarce resources among competing needs. Nor is it on
familiar terms with the state and local political and procedural
apparatus which could come under its receivership were it to
proceed with deciding this case. Nor does it have the familiarity
with state law that is indispensable to adequate decision of this
wrenching problem.52
The court also found that the Seventh Circuit's refined version of
the test, requiring an adequate, even special, remedy available in
the state system, was also satisfied:
The state has constructed a complex system of administrative
review and appeal . . .and has specified a method of judicial
review by way of proceedings in New York Supreme Court
under CPLR Article 78. I am reluctant to intrude on this system. My reluctance is magnified in this case by indications that
plaintiffs' attorneys are engaging in forum shopping and attempts to avoid going through normal state channels.53
The Canaday court was not persuaded by plaintiffs' claim that
abstention would be improper because they presented a federal
statutory claim in their complaint.5 4 "The presence of a federal
constitutional question will not in and of itself prevent abstention ....If there is in fact a federal statutory claim here at all, it is
so intertwined with unsettled questions of state law that sound discretion argues in favor of abstention. '55 The Marisol court's dismissal of the Canaday opinion, which was affirmed by the Second
Circuit, without so much as a comment on the above analysis, is
disquieting. The child welfare issue in Marisol, like the homelessness issue in Canaday, is a matter of substantial state interest regulated predominantly by state and local efforts.5 6
In Marisol, Mayor Guiliani's ACS was an entirely new local effort housed within a complex administrative scheme. In both
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Canaday, 608 F. Supp. 1460, 1469-70.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1470-71.
See supra note 79.
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Canaday and Marisol, a remedy was available at the state level
through Article 78 of the New York State Civil Code. 57 The ultimate issue in Marisol was whether ACS was operating so as to violate plaintiffs' state and federal rights. Any statutory and
constitutional questions were so inextricably intertwined with the
resolution of state administrative law questions that discretion
would suggest abstention. Finally, the Canaday court judge was
not convinced by plaintiffs' argument that relief in the state courts
would take an inordinate amount of time. He did not "comprehend the logic that says a federal court can familiarize itself with
the intricate workings of the City's and State's welfare policymaking, unravel the various state law issues and fashion appropriate
relief more easily and quickly than the state system can rule on its
own law."' 58 In failing to rely on Canaday, the Marisol court ignored precedent without so much as a word to distinguish the facts
of the two cases.
The scope of Burford abstention was further illustrated in Morrow v. Winslow, 59 where a Cherokee father challenged the validity
of an Oklahoma adoption proceeding under the Federal Indian
Child Welfare Act ("ICWA") and the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. Though it recognized a unique federal interest
in the welfare of Indian children, and though the ICWA permitted
challenges "in any court of competent jurisdiction," the Tenth Circuit abstained under Burford. The State of Oklahoma had an important interest in the orderly conduct of its adoption proceedings,
and the court found the issue better resolved in the ongoing state
judicial action. Thus, even where a statute explicitly grants jurisdiction to "any court of competent jurisdiction," Burford abstention is possible.
Regarding the application of Burford in federal preemption
cases, the Supreme Court's New Orleans opinion stated:
Unlike a claim that a state agency has misapplied its lawful authority or has failed to take into consideration or properly weigh
relevant state-law factors, federal adjudication of this sort of
pre-emption claim would not disrupt the State's attempt to ensure uniformity in the treatment of an "essentially local
problem."6"
57.
58.
59.
60.

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (McKinney 2001).
Canaday, 608 F. Supp. at 1475.
Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386 (10th Cir. 1996).
New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 362.
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In this passage, the Court asserts that Burford abstention is appropriate when a state agency has wrongly utilized its lawful power
or ignored state law. Questions of federal statutory law, meanwhile, fall well within the competence of the federal courts. We
read this to imply that true issues of federal law preempt state
claims, while vague statutory claims, such as those in Marisol, can
be dismissed where more pressing state law issues exist.
III.

FEDERALISM

In Younger v. Harris, Justice Black justified abstention on
grounds of comity and federalism:
[The] underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is . . . 'comity,' that is, a
proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that
the entire country is made up of a union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the states and their institutions are
left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way
to de61
scribe it, is referred to by many as 'Our Federalism.'
It may be thought that the consent decree,6 2 the typical remedy
in child welfare institutional reform litigation, eliminates or dramatically reduces federalism concerns because the state agency voluntary consents to federal oversight. Federalism concerns,
however, have traditionally not been so easily dismissed.
In Pennsylvania v. Williams, for example, the U.S. Supreme
Court overturned a district court's appointment of a receiver to
liquidate a bankrupt Pennsylvania building loan firm.6 3 Instead,
the Court dictated that the liquidation be carried out under a Pennsylvania administrative procedure, stating that federal courts must
respect the independence of state governments in carrying out domestic policy. 64 This rationale is similar to that of the Burford doctrine, and set the stage for the Marisol court to refuse to provide
the requested equitable relief. More recently, in Rizzo v. Goode,
the Supreme Court rejected the order of a federal district court
mandating that the Philadelphia Police Department develop a pro61. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
62. The consent decree is a "judgment entered by consent of the parties whereby
the defendant agrees to stop alleged illegal activity without admitting guilt or wrongdoing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 411 (6th ed. 1990).

63. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935).
64. Id. at 185.
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gram, under a series of court-issued guidelines, for citizens to complain about alleged police misconduct. Writing for the majority,
Justice Rhenquist suggested that appropriate consideration be
given to federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief. 66 Though Rizzo remains good law, federalism has
never served as the basis for limiting the equitable power of a federal court.67 Event the concept has provoked unkind words from
some commentators.68
A Columbia Law Review Note suggests that since a court is not
required to enter consent decrees, it can, through Rizzo, consider
federalism in such refusals, forming the basis for Burford abstention in the principal case.6 9 We agree with the argument set forth
in the Note insofa:r as it suggests that federalism is a factor in determining whether to refuse to enter a consent decree. However, we
add the additional consideration of managerial responsibility to the
list of factors a federal court should consider. In our view, where
both federalism and managerial responsibility are substantially at
issue, a federal court should, through Burford and Rizzo, abstain
from decision and refuse to enter a consent decree.7 °
IV.

ABSTENTION AND PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Judge Bork, writing for the District of Columbia Circuit, found
deference to local decision making an insufficient justification for
Burford abstention:
65. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-73 (1976).
66. 423 U.S. at 379.
67. Note, Federalism and Federal Consent Decrees Against State Governmental Entities, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1796, 1800 (1988).
68. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 3-30 (2d ed.

1988) (noting "the inappropriateness of blind deference on federalism grounds to
non-judicial organs of the state in the face of federal challenges to them .... "); Owen
Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1159-60 (1977) (noting that the federalism articulated in Rizzo "consists of a desire to insulate the status quo from judicial interference," and that it represents "a hostility toward the activism of judges").
69. Note, supra note 66.
70. One might also view this as an administrative extension of the logic of Walter
Dellinger in Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1532, 1552-53 (1972):
Where the judiciary independently infers remedies directly from constitutional provisions, Congress may legislate an alternative remedial scheme
which it considers equally effective in enforcing the Constitution and which
the Court, in the process of judicial review, deems adequate substitute for
the displaced remedy.
In the Marisol scenario, for example, ACS constituted a legislative act by the City of
New York to create a remedial scheme. In continuing the litigation, Judge Ward effectively vetoed this legitimate remedial process.
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The sensitivity of state policy ... is the traditional reason for
invoking Burford abstention, and deference to local decisionmaking does further federalism. Nonetheless, sensitivity and
the notion of localism alone do not provide a principled rationale for abstention where federal jurisdiction admittedly exists.
Federal courts routinely decide local matters of great sensitivity
and we are not convinced that abstention from a federal question case may be based on this rationale.7 1

Judge Bork's eloquence rightly gives us pause. Are federalism
and the need to prevent federal courts from imposing upon a state
administrative scheme sufficient to warrant abstention? These are
important rationales; however, a third rationale, that of responsible
administration, when added to the other two, ultimately justifies
Burford abstention.
Federal courts have frequently deferred to bureaucratic expertise in the past. According to Mark Tushnet, the Supreme Court's
procedural due process cases embody such deference:
The Court's judgments play out as deference to professionals in
bureaucracies. They are not expressed, as a general theory of
judicial restraint might suggest they would be, as deference to
the will of the majority as embodied in the decisions of the representative legislatures that established the bureaucracies that
adopted the procedures at issue. The imagery of professionalism, not that of democracy, makes more sense of the situation.72
The nation need not fear a professional executive respected by
federal courts. Such respect can create more intelligent and feasible remedies for aggrieved parties.73 We welcome, then, the U.S.
Supreme Court's words in Parham v. J.R.:
As the scope of governmental action expands into new areas
creating new controversies for judicial review, it is incumbent on
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of the individual without unduly burdeningthe legitimate efforts of the states to
deal with difficult social problems. The judicial model for

factfinding for all constitutionally protected interests, regardless
of their nature, can turn rational decisionmaking into an unmanageable enterprise."
71. Silverman v. Barry, 727 F.2d 1121, 1124 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
72. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
TUTIONAL LAW

233 (1988).

73. See supra notes 95-95 and accompanying text.
74. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 n.16 (1979) (emphasis added).

OF CONSTI-
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Expertise matters. We hasten to add, however, that such expertise must be applied responsibly to the public interest. 75 This notion of responsibility is the subject of the remainder of this article.
V.

A

TEST REGARDING THE PROPRIETY OF ABSTENTION

We propose the following test for Burford abstention where an
institutional defendant is a human services agency: A federal District Court should abstain from adjudicating constitutional claims
raised by plaintiffs seeking structural remedies where (1) the management is not the proximate cause of the infringement of the right,
and (2) the management is responsible.
The management is not the proximate cause of the infringement
in cases where, like Marisol, management has had no chance to
begin reforms, or where there is simply no proof that managerial
decisions have violated a plaintiff's rights.76 Management is responsible when the managerial decisions comport with the precept
of managerial responsibility.
This test permits the responsible exercise of administrative discretion. It allows a cadre of professionals - public administrators
of human service agencies - to interpret the laws that govern
them, and to work towards collective justice - providing adequate
services to most beneficiaries at the expense of the constitutional
rights of a few. If the precept of managerial responsibility is operating, constitutional considerations of individual justice may safely
give way to executive concerns of collective justice. To be sure, the
cost of providing services alone is not compelling enough to outweigh an individual constitutional right.77 Maintaining a level of
services for other clients, however, is often compelling under the
"mere rationality" approach to constitutional review of social regulation. 71 Collective justice in child welfare, we urge, should be determined at the state level, where it and many other social welfare
75. See infra notes 265-301 and accompanying text for a discussion of responsible
public administration.
76. Note that we urge abstention only where structural remedies are sought, see,
for example, text accompanying note 20. If the remedies sought would not overturn
the administrative regime of the institutional defendant, our extension of the Burford
abstention doctrine would not apply.
77. B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1398 (N.D. III. 1989) (noting that "concern
with the availability of resources is rarely part of the constitutional decisionmaking
process where a recognized constitutional right is violated.")
78. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (great deference accorded in equal protection challenges); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (great
deference accorded to a statutory scheme in due process challenges to "social welfare" legislation).
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policies have historically been formed.79 Our proposed test would
allow courts to encourage innovative solutions to policy problems
by state and local governments, 8°or "policy diffusion," an important
function of modern federalism.
We believe the Marisol court should have abstained and remanded the case to the New York state courts. The state courts
could have determined if the child welfare agency's administrative
scheme was "arbitrary or capricious" under the judicial review provisions of Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Code. 8' Ab79. See John Boli-Bennett & John Meyer, The Ideology of Childhood and the
State: Rules Distinguishing Children in National Constitutions,43 AM. Soc. REV. 797
(1978); Julia C. Lathrop, The Children's Bureau, 18 AM. J. Soc. 318 (1912) (director
of first federal child welfare initiative discusses sharing of obligations with dominant
state policymakers); James T. Patterson, The New Deal and the States, 73 AM. HIST.
REV. 70 (1967). Another example of a social problem entering the administrative
realm at the state level is homelessness. See Donna Wilson Kirchheimer, Sheltering
the Homeless in New York City: Expansion in an Era of Government Contraction, 104
POL. SCI. Q. 607 (1989) (noting that urban homelessness became an important urban
administrative topic roughly from 1978 to 1988).
80. See Charles R. Wise, The Supreme Court's New ConstitutionalFederalism:Implicationsfor Public Administration, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 343 (2001); see also David
Rosenbloom & Bernard Ross, Toward a New Jurisprudenceof ConstitutionalFederalism: The Supreme Court in the 1990s and Public Administration, 28 AM. REV. PUB.
ADMIN. 107 (1998). This line of reasoning planted its roots in the mid-twentieth century. See Edgar McVoy, Patterns of Diffusion in the United States, 5 AM. Soc. REV.
219 (1940). Its popularity among political scientists grew dramatically in the 1960s
and 1970s. See Jack Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States,
63 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 880 (1969); see also Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A
Diffusion Study, 67 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1174 (1973).
81. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803(3) (McKinney 1999). Article 78 provides the basis for judicial review in the New York State courts. It was enacted in 1937 to replace the
confusing use of common law writs for actions against government: "the intended
purpose and effect of Article 78 ... was to simplify and unify the procedure in connection with the three old remedies of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition, and to
wipe out technical distinctions which hampered the court in granting relief for proved
grievances." N.Y. JUR. 2d 6 § 2 (1997). Nonetheless, Article 78 retains many characteristics of writ pleading. Under the common law, claims such as those we suggest
should be heard by the state courts in Marisol would be pursued through mandamus
to review. This is proper for requesting judicial review of an agency's exercise of
judgment or discretion exercised in the absence of a trial-type hearing. Mandamus to
review is now requested under section 7803, which reads: "The only questions that
may be raised in a proceeding under this article are ... whether a determination was
made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary
and capricious or an abuse of discretion." N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803 (McKinney 1999). This
is essentially the question posed to the Marisol court, though that complaint was
presented in constitutional and statutory terms.
The New York Court of Appeals has stated that "[a]rbitrary action is without sound
basis in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts." Pell v. Bd. of Ed.,
313 N.E.2d 321, 325 (N.Y. 1974). In determining whether an action is arbitrary and
capricious, the court found the question to be whether the action has a "rational basis." Id. at 325. This rational basis must be adjudged exclusively on grounds stated by
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stention also assigns primary responsibility for managing a public
agency to professionals who are accountable to the local citizens,
and possess expertise in both public administration and, in the
Marisol example, child welfare administration. Judicial review by
state courts and the development of state administrative law
through common law provides a check against the misuse of power
by public managers in state and municipal agencies, without granting policymaking authority to generalist, unelected federal judges.
Adherence to the precept of managerial responsibility and the development of a state common law of administration ensures service
to the public will. Beyond this, accountability, judgment, balance,
and rationality - the four elements of our precept - do most of
the work, and management typically becomes a form of
incrementalism.82
These notions of policy diffusion and deference to professionalism provide a strong rationale for federal court abstention. For the
diffusion of innovations, such as the creation of ACS, to prove beneficial, they must be allowed to take root. As long as agencies are
managed according to the precept, reform programs should be
given reasonable opportunity to succeed, with a judicial check
available when specific elements of such programs fail. As such,
the judiciary operates between-the-branches to ensure that legislative policy interests and constitutional values are translated into
implementation goals. Public administrators are uniquely situated
to turn those goals into realities.
Instead of going to federal court, the Marisol plaintiffs should
have used Article 78 to challenge the creation of ACS, and to seek
review of the city's child welfare administration procedures. There
the agency at the time Ihe challenged action was taken and not on litigating positions
or other after-the-fact rationales. Scherbyn v. Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Co-op.
Educ. Servs., 573 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1991). Furthermore, a court may require a trial to
determine the facts on which the agency relied in making the challenged decision.
Pasta Chef, Inc. v. State Liquor Auth., 389 N.Y.S.2d 72 (App. Div.), affid, 377 N.E.2d
480 (N.Y. 1976). Section 7801 also provides that:
Except where otherwise provided by law, a proceeding under this article
shall not be used to challenge a determination:
1. which is not final or can be adequately reviewed by appeal to a court or
to some other body or officer where the body or officer making the determi-

nation is expressly authorized by statute to rehear the matter upon the petitioner's application unless the determination to be reviewed was made upon
a rehearing, or a rehearing has been denied, or the time within which the
petitioner can procure a rehearing has elapsed.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (McKinney 1999). This provision ensures that the agency's action
be final and that the petitioner exhaust all avenues for review before coming to court.
82. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
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was an interpretive act83 by the Mayor, the creation of an entirely
new scheme to administer child welfare, and no avenues of review
were available within ACS in this regard. New York courts have
held that "an article 78 proceeding is the proper method for the
determination of whether a statute in a specific instance has been
applied in an unconstitutional manner. It is not the proper vehicle
84
to test the general constitutionality of legislative enactments.
Consequently, an Article 78 proceeding could be used to determine whether the creation of ACS and its procedures represent an
executive interpretation of state law that violates both federal and
state constitutional provisions." Additionally, arbitrary and capricious review under Section 7803 can consider managerial responsibility, and state law doctrine can develop in that regard, improving
the quality of the check on administrative discretion. It is our view
that these aspects of Article 78 review show that the structural reform claims in Marisol are redundant. The New York courts can
adjudicate all claims brought by the plaintiffs, and the federal lawsuit should have been dismissed under Burford as forum shopping.
In our view, the development of a common law around the precept of managerial responsibility is the optimal solution to this
problem. In stark contrast to the pre-existing remedial structure
imposed when a federal court accepts the plaintiffs' formulation of
a public agency's ills, a common law would allow for questions of
responsibility to be adjudicated over time. This is a hybrid form of
what is termed "fire alarm oversight" in the political science literature regarding the legislative control of bureaucracy:
In order to avoid the high cost of formal, extensive, and systematic investigations . . .legislators have developed a system of

'fire alarm oversight' in which interest groups and constituents
monitor administrators and inform Congress of improper, inappropriate , or unsatisfactory decisions.86

83. To wit, the mayor's interpretation of the statutes and constitutional provisions

discussed in the text accompanying supra note 8 was that an agency like ACS was
required.
84. R & G Outfitters, Inc. v. Bouchard, 475 N.Y.S. 2d 549, 550 (App. Div. 1984).
85. Plaintiffs charged that, among other things, ACS had violated "Articles 2, 3, 6,
and 7 of the New York State Social Services Law; Articles 6 and 10 of the New York
State Family Court Act; state regulations codified at 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 400-484; and
other state plans." Marisol, 929 F. Supp. at 672.
86. Jeffrey Hill & James Brazier, ConstrainingAdministrative Decisions:A Critical
Examination of the Structure and Process Hypothesis, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG.373, 373

(1991). The literature is primarily known as that of "congressional dominance."
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In Marisol, the same interest groups that currently monitor ACS,
such as Children's Rights, Inc., the attorney for the Marisol plaintiffs, will continue their watchdog role. Moreover, their claims can
be specific, not embodied in a gargantuan, institutional reform
class action suit, and previous administrative claims can serve as
bounds for future claims. When ACS makes an unsatisfactory87 determination, watchdog groups will sound the fire alarm through
mandamus to review that particular determination. Similar to institutional reform suits, these actions will resonate with the political branches and the press, often leading to administrative reforms.
An acceptance of the precept of managerial responsibility by the
courts would recognize that a common law process can create administrative law 88 that will flesh out the contours of judgment, accountability, balance, and rationality.
Legal commentators have made conclusions consistent with our
propositions. Marshall's famous maxim - ubi jus ibi remedium every right has a remedy 9 - is a principle not always attained,
rather than an ironclad rule. 9° Such a view "readily accommodates
the familiar idea that Congress may substitute one remedy for another within some generally adequate scheme of constitutional enforcement." 91 They further argue that "[s]ince no remedial scheme
will be optimal for all plaintiffs, the legislative power to provide
one remedy and withhold another strongly implies that there will
be situations where individual victims of constitutional violations
do not receive effective redress. '92 Nonetheless, '[u]nredressed
constitutional violations may have to be tolerated, but they should
not be embraced, approved, or allowed to proliferate."9
Considering this dilemma, Henry Monaghan noted over twentyfive years ago that a
87. Marisol, 929 F. Supp. at 672.
88. See CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1997); Anthony
Bertelli, Developing a Common Law of Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Rational Choice InstitutionalAnalysis, 15 J.L. & POL. 717 (1999) passim (arguing that the gradual devel-

opment of a common law regarding the use of cost-benefit analysis by regulatory
agencies will create a similarly efficient legal solution).

89. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803), Justice Marshall
wrote: "The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation,
if the laws furnish no remedy for a violation of a vested legal right."
90. Richard Fallon, Jr. & Daniel Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1778 (1991).
91. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in ConstitutionalLaw, 109 YALE

L. J. 87, 88 (1999).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 89.
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[s]urprising amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional 'interpretation' is best understood as something of a quite
different order-a structure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but
not required by, various constitutional provisions; in short, a
to amendment, modification,
constitutional common law subject
94
or even reversal by Congress.

Remedies are not demanded at once by the Constitution, but
rather are developed over time by federal courts treating past considerations as heuristics while groping for new "interpretations."
Daryl Levinson calls this tat6nnement process "remedial
equilibration":
Constitutional rights do not, in fact, emerge fully formed from
abstract interpretation of constitutional text, structure, and history, or from philosophizing about constitutional values ....
[C]onstitutional rights are inevitably shaped by, and incorporate, remedial concerns. Constitutional adjudication is func95
tional not just at the level of remedies, but all the way up.
If constitutional rights are determined with regard to remedies,
then remedies must consider the demands of policy implementation on public managers. To eschew consideration of these constraints is to create a constitutional common law that cannot
function, for it is unrealistic to think that agencies like ACS can
eliminate all rights violations emerging from judicial interpretation
of the Constitution. 96 State courts are closer and more accessible
to state and municipal agencies, and can, as a consequence, grope
toward a more realistic legal equilibrium.
This corresponds to the notion, most famously argued by Charles
Lindblom,97 that bureaucracy cannot and does not have all the answers. Ipso facto, it cannot and does not have all the answers when
it comes to questions of rights. If a bureaucracy operates such that
a judge perceives a rights violation, the corresponding holding of
that judge will not guarantee the end of that rights violation. The
94. Henry P. Monaghan, Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L.
1, 2-3 (1975) (arguing that courts over-enforce rights where they go beyond
constitutional mandates); see also Lawrence Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218 (1978) (noting a
correlative underenforcement where courts confront their institutional limitations).
95. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,99 COLUM.
L. REV. 857, 873 (1999).
96. See infra notes 107-135 and accompanying text.
97. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 79 (1959); Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADREV.

MIN. REV.

517 (1979).
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violation may be inherent in the imperfections of bureaucratic operations and incapable of being changed by judicial order. The
common law process is consonant with incremental policymaking
and can take advantage of the learning that goes on while the
agency muddles its way through. If a client does not like the way a

bureaucrat processed his claim, he may sue, but only the procedural claim will be adjudicated, not its interconnection with some abstract right. This is, we think, a truer process of "remedial
equilibration."
On this point, "judicial capacity" scholars argue that there are
serious limits to the efficacy of judicial supervision. 98 For example,

Gerald Rosenberg argues that courts can seldom produce significant social reform because they are limited by three constraints

built into the structure of the American political system. 99 These
three constraints are (1) "the limited nature of Constitutional
rights," (2) "the lack of judicial independence," [and] (3) "the judi-

ciary's lack of powers of implementation."' 10 Our argument is different. Federal courts may or may not be equipped to reform
human service agencies. We contend that public managers are so
appointed, and they should answer to courts only on specific issues
regarding implementation. 10 Moreover, logic dictates that it is
easier to examine a detail of agency operations than their totality,
98. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG,THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 13-21 (1991); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE
GUARDIANS? (1989); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as PoliticalPowerbroker:Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 93-94 (1979).
99. ROSENBERG,supra note 98, at 35.
100. Id.
101. Our argument also avoids any notion that public managers should be accorded
deference to their "professional judgment." Consider the following. In DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 198 (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause imposes no duty on a state to provide
affirmative protective services to its citizens. Joshua DeShaney was a young boy
beaten by his father to the point of lasting retardation. The defendant child welfare
agency had taken him into custody, and then returned him to his father for the final
beating even though it received various complaints and was on notice of the father's
penchant for violence.
The state had done nothing, said the court, but Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun saw something different. Once a complaint was made to the defendant
agency, the job of neighbor, friend, and ordinary citizen was over, and the state was
now in control of DeShaney's protection. There was no incentive for continued private monitoring of the situation. For these dissenters, the administrative scheme must
work to protect DeShaney and his peers after the report, or the agency must be held
liable under the Due Process Clause. Professional judgment precedent, by contrast,
ensures that once a social worker made a decision in regard to the disposition of
DeShaney's case, given his professional expertise and experience, he could not be
held liable for negligence. DeShaney should have been protected.
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and consequently, that a common law approach to these matters is
sensible as it amalgamates details.
In sum, we urge that courts consider both federalism and a precept of managerial responsibility when determining whether to abstain under Burford where a public bureaucracy is being charged
with mismanagement and structural reform is sought.
VI.

RESPONSIBILITY: LETTING MANAGERS MANAGE

10 2

This Part argues for a judicially recognized precept of managerial
responsibility.
Responsible public management is essential to governmental effectiveness and to the achievement of collective, as opposed to individual, justice. Evidence of managerial responsibility cannot be
drawn solely from individual case records-the basis of claims
against human services administration in institutional reform cases.
We instead argue, with considerable support in the literature, that
managers should be judged by how well they address the totality of
their responsibilities, not by how well they serve a particular group
interest. "The goal to be sought combines adequate recognition of
personal rights as declared in the Constitution
with effective
'
achievement of great social programs. "103

Our precept of managerial responsibility is derived from the theory of public administration, particularly from doctrines governing
administrative responsibility. Our goal is to relocate judicial reOur argument implies that the Wisconsin administrative scheme that discouraged
continued citizen involvement, while allowing social workers to do nothing to protect
DeShaney did not comport with a precept of managerial responsibility. Certainly, the
architects of such a scheme should not receive deference to their professional judgment. The threshold question that came before the court was rather narrow: Had the
state taken such affirmative steps necessary to place upon it a duty to protect the
child? The court said that it had not, but even if it had, the remedy should not be for
the court itself to ensure that this case is not repeated. Rather, it would say that a
constitutional child welfare administrative scheme must not shun the public's role as
this one does. If management, in complying with the ruling, fails again on this point,
it is not "off the hook" on grounds of its reasonable exercise of professional judgment.
Quite to the contrary, it must face challenges on the issue that eventually develop a
common law of administration on that point. Abstention, working with the precept,
lays the groundwork for common law tat6nnement.
102. Donald Kettl coined the phrase "letting managers manage." See Donald F.
Kettl, The Global Revoluation in Public Management: Driving Themes, Missing Links,

16 J.

OF POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 446 (1997).

103. LEONARD D. WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 445, 455. In a similar vein, Charles A. Beard argued, "the continuous and fairly
efficient discharge of certain functions by government, central and local, is a necessary condition for the existence of any great society." Charles A. Beard, Administration, a Foundation of Government, 34 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 232 (1940).
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view of complex agency operations to promote collective justice
while protecting individual rights.
A. Theory of Responsible Administration
Public managers in a republic answer to the people through
democratic institutions. Gerald Garvey has defined the paradigmatic problem of republican administration as follows: "Administrative action in any political system, but especially in a democracy,
must somehow realize two objectives simultaneously. It is necessary to construct and maintain administrative capacity, and it is
equally necessary to control it in order to ensure the responsiveness of the public bureaucracy to higher authority."1 "4
Unfortunately, creating an effective balance of capacity and control is not a straightforward matter. As we shall show, that balance
must be sustained by a sense of responsibility on the part of public
managers that is encouraged and respected by legislatures and
courts.
B. Responsibility in a Democracy
The administrative capacity essential to good government requires that administrators have power to take action in fulfilling
public policy goals. At the same time, such executive authority
must be responsible to the legislature and less directly to the polity.
A theory of responsible administration requires, as a prerequisite,
a theory of how power should be distributed among democratic
institutions.1 5 For example, such a theory must recognize the inherent tension between, on one hand, protecting individual rights,
and, on the other,
securing the benefits of an efficient
10 6
administration.
In any such theory, the role of the courts in effecting the operative trade-off is critical, but it must not be seen as exclusively judicial. Federal judges must operate as facilitators between the
executive and legislative branches, and between the state and federal governments. Their task is to ensure that this tradeoff is performed reasonably, without trampling on individual rights.
104. Gerald Garvey, False Promises: The NPR in HistoricalPerspective, in INSIDE
87 (Donald F.
Kettl & John J. Dilulio Jr. eds., 1995).
105. Hyneman summarized the problem at the federal level as "how to relate the
federal bureaucracy and the power it possesses to the institutions and ways that are
essential to democratic government." CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, BUREAUCRACY IN A
DEMOCRACY 12 (1950).
106. See generally JOHN A. ROHR, To RUN A CONSTITUTION 154 (1986).
THE REINVENTION MACHINE: APPRAISING GOVERNMENTAL REFORM

2001]

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION
C.

Serving the Vulnerable

Assuring responsible administration of public human service
agencies attempting to meet the needs of society's most vulnerable
clients is especially difficult. Human service agencies, such as New
York City's Administration for Children's Services, have attributes
that greatly complicate public management and judicial review of
cases and functions within their purview. The most salient of these
attributes is that human beings constitute their "raw material."
Their core activities are structured to process, sustain, or change
people who come under their jurisdiction. °7
Several things follow from this fact. First, clients can affect, even
participate in, the service that is performed. 10 8 Second, human service provision is moral work, requiring moral judgments about the
worth of clients, about the social value of the service or treatment,
and about how scarce resources shall be allocated among deserving
claimants." 9 These are inherently controversial choices infused
with concepts of justice and propriety. " ° Third, human service organizations require the support of the institutional environment,
especially the political environment that authorizes policies and appropriates resources. Fourth, the technologies they employ must
conform to dominant cultural beliefs about what is desirable and
acceptable to do to people.1"1 ' Fifth, there is an inherent indeterminacy to the means employed to reach service goals having to do
with "the ability of clients to react and participate in the service
technology. The reactivity of the clients and their potential capacity to neutralize the effects of the service technology means that
the organization cannot take its service technologies for granted,
even if they are assumed to be highly determinate."' 2
These distinctive attributes of human service organizations shape
their governance and the roles of their managers. The morally
charged, controversial, and ambiguous nature of human service
107. Yeheskel Hasenfeld, The Nature of Human Service Organizations, in

HUMAN

SERVICES AS COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 4-5 (Yeheskel Hasenfeld ed., 1992) [hereinafter Hasenfeld, Nature]; see also YEHESKEL HASENFELD, HUMAN SERVICE ORGANI[hereinafter HASENFELD, HUMAN SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS];
ZATIONS (1983)

Thomas D'Aunno, The Effectiveness of Human Service Organizations:A Comparison
of Models, in HUMAN SERVICES AS COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS, supra, at 341-61.
108. Hasenfeld, Nature, supra note 107, at 5.
109. JON ELSTER, LOCAL JUSTICE: How INSTITUTIONS ALLOCATE SCARCE GOODS
AND NECESSARY BURDENS (1992).
110. See generally Hasenfeld, Nature, supra note 107.
111. Id. at 12.
112. Id. at 15.
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provision virtually precludes the creation of precise standards.'1 3
Thus, statutes governing human service provisions are likely to be
incomplete, vague, and perhaps internally inconsistent or contradictory. Child protection managers and workers, for example, are
statutorily committed to both reunifying families and terminating
parental rights for the sake of the child's well-being.
For these reasons, it is difficult to identify a clear line demarcating acceptable and unacceptable managerial performance. No
single-valued criterion, like profitability, exists to assess managerial
responsibility in a public human service agency. Nonetheless,
when faced with an institutional reform lawsuit alleging managerial
incompetence, a federal judge must decide whether to abstain or
1 14
attempt to draw that line.
D.

The Shortcomings of Judicial Review
Uncertainty, ambiguity, and conflicts of interest are pervasive in
human service organizations.' 5 The language of statutes governing these agencies cannot cover every contingency." 6 Public
managers retain discretion to act in accordance with their own
judgment, with potential policy and justice implications.1 1 7
As a consequence of this inevitable discretion, intractable
"wicked" problems arise. 8 Grounds for structural reform class
113. On the notion of impossibility, see infra note 140 and accompanying text.
114. While the focus of our argument is judicial review of human service agencies,
our point is quite general: different kinds of organizations call for not only appropriate public management but also for appropriate judicial review if the interests of both
collective and individual justice are to be served.
115. See Hasenfeld, Nature, supra note 107.
116. According to Justice Felix Frankfurter,
Unlike mathematical symbols, the phrasing of a document, especially a complicated enactment, seldom attains more than approximate precision . . .
Apart from the ambiguity inherent in its symbols, a statute suffers from
dubeties. It is not an equation or a formula representing a clearly marked
process, nor is it an expression of individual thought to which is imparted the
definiteness a single authorship can give. A statute is an instrument of government partaking of its practical purposes but also of its infirmities and
limitations, of its awkward and groping efforts.
Justice Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 528 (1947). Economists take similar views. See generally OLIVER HART,
FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995).
117. See Evelyn Z. Brodkin, Policy Politics: If We Can't Govern, Can We Manage?,
102 POL. ScI. Q. 571 (1987).
118. Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber have defined "wicked problems" as those
problems that are inherently ill-defined and have no solutions in the usual sense of
the term, as distinct from engineering problems, which are definable, separable, and
soluble. Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of
Planning,4 POL'Y SCI. 155 (1973).
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actions are not difficult to adduce; there is ample room for a group
with interests at stake to claim its own answer is the only correct
one. The filing of a lawsuit reflecting such a claim is widely regarded as a form of political action undertaken when other avenues for making claims on public resources, e.g., legislative
advocacy, are more costly, uncertain, or have already proven unsuccessful. 119 Courts may be called upon to determine the appropriateness of managerial actions that allegedly violated
constitutional rights.t l 0 As the governmental system has grown in
complexity, however, complaints in class action lawsuits allege not
only specific incidents of employee misconduct but also general incompetence on the part of public managers, or even their elected
superiors, sufficiently pervasive to warrant equitable structural
12
reform. 1
Judicial review of administrative agencies vested with large
amounts of discretionary decision making authority is inherently
problematic. The rules applicable to such complex circumstances
are far from obvious, and both authoritative standards of administrative competence and knowledge of the efficacy of structural
remedies are generally lacking on the bench. Under such circumstances, ill-considered judicial intervention on behalf of individual
rights violations due to alleged incompetence on the part of the
institutional defendant may exacerbate rather than ameliorate the
underlying problem through its lack of regard for the agency's statutory mandates, which commit it to achieving collective justice.
Thus committed, an agency's managers may reach different
an1 22
swers to the underlying problem than those of the plaintiffs.
The central dilemma is apparent. The court is in the position of
adjudicating a trade-off between administrative capacity to achieve
collective justice in a responsible manner, on the one hand, and the
119. See Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1982); Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 958 (1978).

120. See infra notes 299-302 and accompanying text.
121. That the rights of a class of individuals have been violated may imply a systemic problem requiring structural reform. See generally OWEN Fiss, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS INJUNCTION 94 (1978). See also PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT (1983)
(arguing that damages liability against government is the most efficient solution, but
sometimes cannot be achieved, giving way to a need for the structural injunction).
122. PATRICK DUNLEAVY, DEMOCRACY, BUREAUCRACY, AND PUBLIC CHOICE
(1991); Barbara Koremenos and Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., Leadership of a State Agency:
An Analysis Using Game Theory, in THE STATE OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 213-40
(Donald F. Kettl & H. Brinton Milward eds., 1996); Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., Policy
Achievement as a Collective Good: A Strategic Perspective on Managing Social Programs, in PUBLIC MANAGEMENT THEORY 108-133 (Barry Bozeman ed., 1993).
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ability of citizens lto control the institutional defendant, expressed
as the prevention and amelioration of specific individual rights violations, on the other, by constraining the delegation of responsibility to public managers and workers. 123 The court's judgment is
consequential: too little control risks irresponsible conduct by arrogant technocrats threatening individual rights; too much control
risks a reduction in administrative capacity to secure collective justice while protecting individual rights in an acceptable manner albeit perhaps not a manner preferred by plaintiffs.
Refusal to recognize this trade-off leads courts to regard human
service agencies as quasi-judicial organizations, resulting in the
proliferation of burdensome pre-existing rules, viewed by stakeholders and the public as red tape, that produce an inferior result. 124 Kenneth ]Davis showed awareness of this when arguing
that, whereas "discretionary justice," like our notion of managerial
responsibility, may require additional rules in some circumstances,
"much discretionary justice is without rules because no one knows
how to formulate rules" and because "discretion is preferred to any
rules that might be formulated. 1 125 He goes on to argue that "[f]or
many circumstances, the mechanical application of a rule means
injustice . . . . Only through discretion can . . . equity be
achieved .... Creativity is impossible without discretion. "126 He
argues further that
123. William Fletcher argues that since court-ordered remedial discretion in institutional suits is political in nature, it should be presumptively regarded as illegitimate.
William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution:Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L. J.635, 637 (1982). We agree, but apply our precept of
managerial responsibility, rather than Fletcher's test, to overcome this presumption:
"[T]he presumption of illegitimacy may be overcome when the political bodies that
should ordinarily exercise such discretion are seriously and chronically in default." Id.
124. By inferior result we mean a result inferior to a Pareto-superior result that
might be achieved with an intervention that promotes responsible conduct by administrators based on trust.
125. KENNETH GULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
15 (1969); see also JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE
SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1927). Dickinson asks:
Within the field of matters which do not admit of reduction to hard and fast
rules, but must be trusted to the discretion of the adjudicating body, can we
say that there is a regime of law? ...It would be unfortunate, if it were
possible, for men to commit all their decisions to minds which run in legal
grooves. The needs of the moment, the circumstances of the particular case,
all that we mean and express by the word 'policy,' have an importance which
professional lawyers do not always allow to them.
Id. at 150-51. He further notes the possible analogy to the relationship between the
court and jury, i.e., a body that exercises discretion and a body that limits discretion
by rule. Id.
126. DAVIS, supra note 125, at 19-20.
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most difficult creative thinking is usually introduced through executive or administrative solutions of specific problems. What
happens over and over is that a legislative body sees a problem
but does not know how to solve it; accordingly, it delegates the
power to work on the problem ... Then the delegate, through
case-to-case consideration, where the human mind is often at its
best, nibbles at the problem ... [which may open] the way for
perspective about the whole big problem, and large solutions
sometimes emerge.' 2 7
Observing judicial suspicion of public administration, James Q.
Wilson posited that courts may fail to grasp how hard it is to solve
organizational problems via court order:
Judges see bureaucrats at a distance and through the lenses of
conventional stereotypes [or through the eyes of plaintiffs].
From a distance, a government agency is a machine designed to
achieve a goal. The judge's job is to start the machine, change
the goal, or both .... [But] agencies are at least as complex and
hard to understand as an exotic and distant native culture that a
traveler has entered for the first time .... If they wish to help
manage agencies, judges will have to learn about agencies and
their management.' 2 8
Judges have little incentive to become experts on bureaucracy,
however, and litigation is too often regarded as a game which the
better lawyers will win 29; more emphasis is placed on "spinning"
the facts than actually trying to educate the court. 3 0 This can lead
to the imposition of inadequate or even counterproductive solutions because the court has an inadequate basis for understanding
the facts. As John Dickinson noted:
A sufficient excuse for distrust of the operation of law in fields
of clashing social opinions is afforded by actual experience of
the failures of the law in these fields, or what is worse, by its
occasional perversion into an instrument of injustice .... [by, on
127. Id. at 20.
128. JAMES Q.
WHY THEY

WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Do

AND

Do IT 292-94 (1989).

129. This is not inherently bad, though, since the adversary system is arguably fine
in ordinary adjudication. Part of the argument between supporters and opponents of
institutional reform litigation focuses upon whether institutional reform is an extraordinary type of judicial involvement. Eisenberg and Yeazell argued that it is
rather routine among court duties in the 1980s, while a more recent conservative,
John Yoo, has countered that it is certainly not ordinary and violates any reasonable
interpretation of the framers' intent toward judicial power. John Choon Yoo, Who
Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal
Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1151-61 (1996).

130.

WILSON,

supra note 128.
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the one hand] rigid and artificial mechanical application of rules
and concepts without regard to their intent and meaning, or to
the facts to which they are applied; and, on the other, an application of the uninformed personal bias of judges in place of that
carefully reasoned development of opposing
considerations
3
which the novelty of the cases calls for.1 1

In other words, the casualty of ill-advised adjudication is collective justice. 32
Even when judges are intent on discovering the underlying reasons for organizational problems and learning the true facts, the
prospect of establishing a satisfactory remedy remains problematic
when there are no right answers, no one best way to manage, no
essential facts or clear-cut criteria by which the appropriateness of
agency decisions can be determined. 133 In such cases, of which
Marisol surely is one, agency managers may reasonably argue that
they should be granted, if not the presumption of good faith, the
opportunity to prove themselves responsible when coping with the
demands of administration.
How might judges enforce responsibility in the management of a
human service agency, where case-by-case analysis is prone to mis131.

DICKINSON,

supra note 125, at 216 (quoting FRANK J.

GOODNOW,

PRINCIPLES

OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (1905) on the differences

between judicial officers and administrative officers). It is that judicial officers determine applicable law given the facts. Administrative officers act often when it is not
the result of any controversy, and do not depend on asking only what the law is, but
also whether it is wise to act.
132. In a related vein, for a criticism of the shortcomings of lawyers as administrators, see Alexander W. Lawrence, The Use and Abuse of Law and Lawyers in Administration, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. 297-307 (1924). See also Morris Fiorina, Legislative Choice
of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process of Administrative Process, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33-66
(1982); Glen 0. Robinson, Commentary on 'Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies': Political Uses of Structure and Process, 75 VA. L. REV.
483, 485 (1989) (citing Aramson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21-37 (1982)). Robinson argues that judicial review will thwart
agency efforts to secure particular political outcomes anticipated by an enacting coalition. He notes that the courts' difficulty in applying the substantial evidence standard
to policy judgments has led to a convergence of this standard with the arbitrary and
capricious standard. Id. at n.37. See also DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257, 262-76 (1979).
133. Ellen Schall, Notes from a Reflective Practitionerof Innovation, in INNOVATION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND DILEMMAS

360-77 (Alan A. Altschuler and Robert D. Behn eds., 1997). Leonard White cites
instances in which "valuation" or issues of "opinion" or of values may lie beyond
"facts" that may be evaluated by courts, e.g., "does a child need each year two pairs of
shoes or three at the bare edge of existence" and "what is a fair amount of insurance
for a working man with a family of three children," i.e., all involving judgments of
"what ought to be." LEONARD D. WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC
ADMINSTRATION

456 (1935).
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taking the trees for the forest, the case for the caseload? Even the
most capable public managers in well-run agencies (including those
under court supervision) cannot preclude harmful outcomes in
every case under their jurisdiction; clients and endogenous factors
can defeat case workers' best efforts. The only reasonable standard for evaluating agency management is diligent and reliable execution of the tasks for which the agency is answerable to
controlling legal authority. This proposition was stated in 1927 by
John Dickinson:
How far legal rules are capable of development to govern...
adjudications is not primarily dependent on the question of
whether or not an issue of social policy is involved, but on the
possibility of isolating facts pertinent in all the cases which may
form the basis for a rule. When this possibility is not present...
rules are out of the question, and all that can be done is to entrust a fact-finding body with the application of a standard, and
hold that body within the bounds of reason. "134
Thus we must inquire how such a standard might best be established in practice. More particularly, how might judges determine
whether an agency has employed appropriate methods of decision
making and whether the methods were properly executed? 135
E.

"Muddling Through"

Any democracy requires responsible administration. We argue
that judges and public administrators have a mutual interest in establishing a precept of managerial responsibility enabling sufficient
governmental capacity to secure collective justice. Such a precept
should incorporate four elements: accountability, judgment, balance, and rationality. Taken together, these four elements constitute a conceptually coherent standard for public administration.
Judges should take this precept into account when determining
whether to abstain from hearing institutional reform cases involving human service agencies.
That judicial intervention in human service agencies is sometimes required is beyond dispute. Without a standard for responsible administration, public bureaucracies can, of course, do great

134. DICKINSON, supra note 125, at 215.
135. See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
CIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 3 (1990).

LAW: RETHINKING JUDI-
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harm.136 Long ago, Charles Hyneman enumerated these harms as
follows:
1) administrative officials and employees may interfere with or
prejudice elections;
2) they may misinform the people about the issues that confront
the public, about how these issues may be dealt with, and about
what is being done to meet them;
3) they may inaugurate and pursue policies of government that
are positively contrary to the public will;
4) they may fail to take the initiative and supply the leadership
that is required of them in view of their relation to particular
sectors of public affairs; and
5) they may, by sheer inefficiency in their37operations, destroy
1
popular faith in democratic government."'
Said Don Price of administrative expertise, "[T]he expert may
come
to believe that his science justifies exceeding his authority. ' ' 138 Public officials may be unwilling or incapable of complying
with governing statutes. They may become defiant or deliberately
indifferent to lawful mandates, and their actions may be illegal.139
They may be unqualified to perform assigned tasks.
More often than not, however, circumstances are less sinister.
Managerial positions in human service agencies often verge on being impossible in several senses.' 40 To satisfy or placate political
constituencies, legislatures often create vague, inconsistent, or virtually unworkable statutes. Legislatures may choose to "shift[ ]
high risk choices to the agency, leaving legislators free to assign
blame if the outcome is unfavorable to their interests.' 41 As Terry
Moe puts it:
136. Literature examining the power of administrative organizations is generally

critical. See, e.g., ERNEST FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND
PROPERTY (1928); DEPT' OF JUSTICE, A FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES, S. Doc. No. 77-8 (1941).
137. HYNEMAN,supra note 105, at 26.
138. Don K. Price, The Judicial Test, in ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
475-99 (Fritz Morstein-Marx ed., 1959).
139. DAVIS, supra note 125, at 12ff; see also SCHUCK, supra note 121, at 1-13.
140. See generally Erwin C. Hargrove & John C. Glidewell, Introduction to IMPOSSIBLE JOBS IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (Erwin C. Hargrove & John C. Glidewell eds.,

1990). Their dimensions of impossibility include the legitimacy of clients, the intensity
of conflict among agency constituencies, public confidence in professional authority,
and strength of the agency myth. Id. at 5ff.
141. Fiorina, supra note 132; Robinson, supra note 132 at 485. In technical terms,
impossibility refers to the logical impossibility of simultaneously satisfying several criteria within the constraints of the problem. See, e.g., GARY MILLER, MANAGERIAL
DILEMMAS 129-30 (1992).
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A bureaucracy that is structurally unsuited for effective action is
precisely the kind of bureaucracy that interest groups and politicians routinely and deliberately create. . . . [B]ecause they are
forced to design bureaucracy through a democratic process,
their structural choices turn out to be very different' 142
indeed from
those intended to promote effective organization."
Inadequate resources may be appropriated, unreasonable workload requirements may be imposed, or mandated missions may be
defined so as to be literally unachievable.
Public managers must nonetheless do the best they can under
difficult, if not impossible, circumstances, even when that means
"muddling through" or coping. 1 43 It is far easier to distinguish between a sinister manager and a muddling manager than it is to understand the myriad constraints on effective management that
make muddling or coping the essence of responsibility. A basis for
making this distinction is needed. A precept of managerial responsibility must be rooted in the specific history of the administrative
state and administrative law in the United States, i.e., in precedents
established in administrative theory and practice.
F.

144
Administrative Responsibility in American Government

The American administrative state has been marked by successive epochs of new public purposes and new administrative forms
to carry them out. Administrative law has evolved in response to
complaints alleging abuses of individual rights under these new administrative arrangements. Continued evolution of the administrative state will generate new types of complaints alleging abuse of
142. JOHN CHUBB AND TERRY MOE, POLITICS MARKETS & AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
(1990); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Pubic
Bureaucracy, in ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND 328-29 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1995).
143. Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, supra note 97; Lindblom, Still
Muddling, supra note 97.
144. The terms accountability, responsibility, and compliance are used by different
sources to more or less refer to the same thing. WILSON, supra note 128, argues that
managing compliance means inducing employees not to shirk or minimizing principalagent problems. HYNEMAN, supra note 105, makes the following bibliographic note
that issues of direction and control of the administrative state are generally discussed
under the heading, "administrative responsibility." He cited as the best sources on
the topic: CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY
(1946); FRONTIERS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (John Gaus, Leonard White &
Marshall Dimock eds., 1936); George A. Graham, Essentials of Responsibility, in
ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 457-74 (Fritz Morstein-Marx ed., 1959);
David M. Levitan, Responsibility of Administrative Officials in a Democratic Society,
61 POL. Sci. Q. 562 (1946).
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rights and courts will impose new equitable remedies. At issue is
whether judicial intervention will enhance or diminish the legitimacy of the managerial role in government.
1.

The Pre-BureaucraticState

In its first century, the American state could be termed pre-bureaucratic. 4 5 Administrative officers, many of them elected, func-

tioned independently of executive authority with funds directly

appropriated to their office.' 46 President Andrew Jackson initiated
the principle of appointments based on patronage, thus inaugurating the spoils system that governed nineteenth century selection of
administrators. 1 47 Legislators, political parties, and the courts exercised haphazard oversight of administration. 48 With respect to the
capacity and control of the pre-bureaucratic state, Leonard White
said:
So long as American administrative systems remained decentralized, disintegrated, and self-governmental and discharged
only a minimum of responsibilities, the necessity of highly developed machinery for its control was unknown. Administration
was weak and threatened no civil liberties; it was unorganized
145. Stephen Skowronek called it a "state of courts and parties." STEPHEN
SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATURAL

ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877-1920, at 25 (1982). "In Martin Van Buren's
master scheme," said Skowronek, referring to the architect of the American party
system as we know it, "American government could be made to work only by two
constituent parties competing across the major sectional divisions of the nation." Id.
at 26. The parties' alter ego, and an important check on their power, was the judiciary: "Courts are naturally passive as instruments of government, and they are radically particularistic in decision making ... [providing] essential counterpoise to the
all-consuming electoral machines of America's party state." Id. at 27. It was in this
environment that the federal spoils and patronage system was born. Id.
146. CHARLES E. MERRIAM, AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS: STUDIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1865-1917, at 7 (1926) (noting "the...
unqualified adherence to the practice of popular election of a very large number of
officials, most with administrative duties").
147. Perhaps it was actually Jefferson who initiated the practice. See 2 E.N. GLADDEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 308-09 (1972). Criteria for executive
appointments prior to the Jacksonian era were "respectability," political loyalty, and,
after Jefferson, representativeness, to insure that a unitary political philosophy did not
dominate administration. See id. After Jackson, ordinary citizens were considered
qualified for public office in accordance with their political loyalties. LEONARD D.
WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY (1965) [hereinafter WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS]; LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY (1954) [hereinafter WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS].
148. LEONARD WHITE, TRENDS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 143 (1933) (noting
that "there is no point which serves as a center to the radii of the administration").
As a result, said White, "responsibility, both of a civil and public order, was ... determined and enforced by the courts, not by order of a chief executive." Id.
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and possessed no power of resistance; it was elective and quickly
responsive to the color and tone of local feeling.' 4 9

In other words, there was no political control problem in the prebureaucratic state.
2.

The Administrative State

Because of its pronounced potential for graft and inefficiency,
the spoils system was challenged by those seeking efficient administration of public services.15 Citing precedents in Great Britain,
France, and Germany, a growing civil service reform movement advocated merit as a basis for appointment to public office and tenure as a way to preclude political reprisals by elected officials.' 51
The Pendleton Act of 1883 initiated the inexorable diffusion of
merit system principles throughout all levels of government. 152 Its
goal was an administrative capacity sufficient to ensure competent
management of expanding governmental responsibilities. 53 Constructing administrative capacity became the project of the Progressive movement from the turn of the century until about
1920.154

The creation of a civil service, comprising technically qualified
individuals insulated from political rewards and reprisals, was a
149. WHITE, supra note 133, at 418.
150. BERNARD S. SILBERMAN, CAGES

OF REASON: THE RISE OF THE RATIONAL
STATE IN FRANCE, JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND GREAT BRITAIN 250-68 (1993);

SKOWRONEK, supra note 145, at 47-84.

151. The creation of a merit system would also relieve pressure on the President
and members of Congress, for whom the burden of filling the growing ranks of federal
employees according to patronage practices was increasingly onerous and controversial; President Garfield had been assassinated by a disappointed office-seeker. See
SKOWRONEK, supra note 145, at 46-68; see also RONALD D. JOHNSON & GARY D.
LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1994).

152. Pendleton Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 42). Two
decades later, fifty percent of federal employees were selected and evaluated by the
merit system.
153. Its premises were not challenged at the federal level until President Carter's
1978 civil service reforms. Of the Pendleton Act, Paul Van Riper has said that "[t]he
new reform [which recognized the importance of individual capacity and of ability]
laid the foundation for the development of that technical expertise crucial to the oper-

ation of the modern state." PAUL
CIVIL SERVICE 111-12, 553 (1958).
154. See

DAVID

H.

VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

ROSENBLOOM,

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:

MANAGEMENT, POLITICS, AND LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE;

ORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

A

UNDERSTANDING,

3-36 (4th ed. 1998);

STUDY OF THE POLITICAL THE-

(1948).
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seminal development in public management. 155 A merit system
shifted the emphasis in public administration from popular representation to neutral competence in the performance of official duties. Professional administration made it feasible for large,
complex government organizations 56 to provide economic regulation, national security, public infrastructure development, maintenance of public order, and social welfare.
Complementing the doctrine of neutral competence in administration was the idea of "scientific management. 1 57 Following
the prescriptions of Frederick Taylor and Henri Fayol, formal
responsibility for administration was to be divided between
managers and workers. 158 Public management was to be based

155. To ensure responsibility in both regulatory and service delivery activities, progressive administrative reforms included restrictions on the political activities of public employees; the spread of the city management model of municipal administration;
the creation of public authorities for the management of public infrastructure, such as
ports and parks; the consolidation of bureaus into comprehensive administrative departments; the regulation of economic activity through independent commissions; and
the institution of the executive budget and other forms of "overhead" administrative
capacity, all reflecting a preference for politically neutral, scientific, and technical
competence in the administration of public services in support of a harmonious, orderly society. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 154, at 91.
156. SILBERMAN, supra note 150, at 263.
157. Woodrow Wilson had called for "a science of administration which shall seek
to straighten the paths of government, to make its business less unbusinesslike, to
strengthen and purify its organization, and to crown its duties with dutifulness."
Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. ScI. Q. 485 (1887). James
Fesler and Donald Kettl note that the article was not widely read until it was reprinted in 1941. JAMES W. FESLER & DONALD F. KETTL, THE POLITICS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1991).
158. See FREDERICK TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF

SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT

(1911). Taylor's work was concerned primarily with the organization of work. Henri
Fayol extended the notion of scientific management to the function of management.
HENRI FAYOL, INDUSTRIAL AND GENERAL ADMINISTRATION (1930). Fayol's work
was, in turn, to influence Gulick. See Luther H. Gulick, Notes on the Theory of Organization, in PAPERS ON THE SCIENCE OF ADMINISTRATION (Luther H. Gulick and
Lyndal F. Urwick eds., 1937). See also FREDERICK CLEVELAND & ARTHUR E. BUCK,
THE BUDGET AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT (1920); HAL G. RAINEY, UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS (1991); Roy G. Radner, Decentralization and Incentives, in INFORMATION,
INCENTIVES, AND ECONOMIC
MECHANISMS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEONID HURWICZ 3-47 (T. Groves, R. Radner,

& S. Reiter eds., 1987). According to Dwight Waldo, "[A]bout 1910[,] scientific management began to be introduced into some branches of public administration ....
Perhaps as much as any other one thing, the 'management' movement has molded the
outlook of those to whom public administration is an independent inquiry or definable discipline." WALDO, supra note 154, at 12. Skowronek adds that state building of
that era represented a "drive toward administrative rationality grounded in scientific
principles of public administration." SKOWRONEK, supra note 145, at 286.
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on scientific 159principles of organization, administration, and

management.

The creation of a "permanent government" staffed by professional civil servants whose appointments were based on their qualifications and who, in time, came to be protected by tenure raised a
new issue.160 How might citizens, legislators, and judges be assured
that the operations of such a bureaucracy reflected the public will?
The Progressives' answer was a strong elected executive whose
power over administration would be patterned after the chief executive officers of the business world. 61 In 1911, President William
Howard Taft's Commission on Economy and Efficiency began to
formulate principles that would make the president head of administration: public law, unified executive power, a rational budget
162
process, formal organization, and efficiency in administration.
The Commission's work eventually led to Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921, a watershed in the establishment of a new bureau159. In his 1927 monograph, W. F. Willoughby, in the spirit of scientific management, asserted the task of administrators to be establishing an appropriate formal
organization, thus insuring adequate structural constraints on the administrator. WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE To THE NATIONAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
(1927). See also MARSHALL E. DIMOCK, MODERN POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION: A
STUDY OF THE CREATIVE STATE (1937); PAPERS ON THE SCIENCE OF ADMINISTRATION (Luther H. Gulick & Lyndal Urwick eds., 1937); Leonard D. White, The Meaning of Principles in Public Administration, in THE FRONTIERS OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION (John M. Gaus, Leonard D. White, & Marshall E. Dimock eds.,
1936). Willoughby emphasized an "institutional" (or what we would today term a
"structural") approach to administration in which "the emphasis is shifted from legal
rules and cases to the formal framework and procedures of the administrative machine." WILLOUGHBY, supra, at 8.
160. V. 0. Key, Jr., Politics and Administration, in THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CHARLES E. MERRIAM 162 (Leonard
D. White ed., 1942), referred to "permanent hierarchies." Charles Merriam referred
to "the idea of expert and permanent administration." CHARLES E. MERRIAM, AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS: STUDIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 1865-1917, at 163 (1926). Arthur Macmahon and John Millett referred to
"the logic of a permanent civil service." ARTHUR W. MACMAHON & JOHN M. MILLETTr, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATORS: A BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH To THE PROBLEM
OF DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT 466 (1939). Carl Friedrich uses the term "perma-

nent administrator." Carl J. Friedrich, Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative
Responsibility, in PUBLIC POLICY: A YEARBOOK OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 1940 14 (1940).
161. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 145, passim; see also JAMES A. MORONE, THE
DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 97-127 (1990).
162. Prominent members included early leaders in public administration Frank J.
Goodnow, Frederick Cleveland (head of the Bureau of Municipal Research), and W.
F. Willoughby. JACK H. KNOTT & GARY J. MILLER, REFORMING BUREAUCRACY:
THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 84 (1987).
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cratic politics. Congress created parallel sets of controls pitted
against each other, 163 for example, a Bureau of the Budget within
the executive branch, and a Bureau of Efficiency and General Accounting Office, under Congressional control. 64 These inconclusive new arrangements "epitomized America's turn-of-the-century
leap from the party state, with its much maligned spoils system, to
an institutional stalemate, with administrators themselves being
asked to make policy' ' decisions in a political system defiant of authoritative controls. 1 65
The accretion of structures and processes comprising the emerging administrative state was labeled "the bureaucracy. '1 66 As the
administrative state evolved, the courts were confronted with issues that coalesced into a distinct new field of American legal practice: administrative law. Nineteenth century judges tended to
endorse laissez faire principles and the social and economic status
quo, 6 7 rather than to countenance discretionary interventions by
public officials. Federal courts were initially hostile to the exercise
of discretion by these new agencies, believing such discretion to be
inherently arbitrary and subject to graft and corruption. 68
The first cracks in the judicial faqade of hostility to administrative discretion came when the Supreme Court insisted that Congressional delegation of authority be accompanied by sufficient
specific standards to limit the scope of agency discretion.' 69 When
regulated businesses sought to quash the discretion of regulatory
163. SKOWRONEK, supra note 145, at 207-08.
164. Id. at 208.
165. Id. at 209.
166. In the 1926 first edition of his textbook, Leonard White referred to the "forms
and methods" of centralization and integration of governmental function, including
federal grants-in-aid to the states. His 1939 revised edition featured lengthy discussion of structure and organization and forms of administrative action, focusing on
departments and their bureaus. LEONARD D. WHITE, INTRODUCTION To THE STUDY
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (rev. ed. 1939). Joseph Rosenfarb referred to "the administrative bureau or tribunal combining the ... executive, legislative, and judicial
processes" as the only administrative form that could "perform the tasks entrusted to
modern government." JOSEPH ROSENFARB, FREEDOM AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE

206 (1948).

167. Id. at 9. See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Chester A. Newland, Faithful Execution of the Laws, Rule of Law, and Autonomy of Public Administration, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC LAW AND ADMINISTRATION (Phillip J. Cooper &
Chester A. Newland eds., 1997).
168. Marshall Dimock, The Criteria And Objectives Of Public Administration, in
THE FRONTIERS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 116-33 (John M. Gaus, Leonard D.
White & Marshall E. Dimock eds., 1936).
169. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 13 (4th ed. 1997); see also Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
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agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Federal Trade Commission, federal and state courts responded by
beginning to create substantive administrative law. This emerging
body of law had four main tenets:
(1) the legislature must create rules and standards limiting
agency discretion when delegating the power to sanction private
parties;
(2) agency procedures must assist in complying with these
directives;
(3) judicial review of (1) and (2) must be available; and
(4) the agency must develop a record to facilitate judicial
review.' 7 o
The emergence of the administrative state created considerable
confusion concerning administrative responsibility. At the federal
level, Steven Skowronek concludes that
[a]s the American state was being fortified with an independent
arm of national administrative action, it was also becoming
mired in operational confusion ....

The national administrative

apparatus was freed from the clutches of party domination, direct court supervision, and localistic orientations only to be
thrust into
the center of an amorphous new institutional
17 1
politics.
Issues relating to control of the regulatory state divided President and party, and left administrative officials without a clear definition of political responsibility. 172 With respect to judicial review
of administrative decisions, Skowronek argues that although
"[m]odern American state building shattered an outmoded judicial
discipline ...it failed to reconstruct a vital
role for the judiciary in
' 173
regulating the new political economy.
170. STEPHEN

BREYER,

RICHARD

STEWART,

CASS

SUNSTEIN

&

MATTHEW

SPITZER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND

CASES 18-19 (1999).

171. Id. at 286-87.
172. SKOWRONEK, supra note 145, at 211.
173. Id. at 286. The traditional view of judicial review originated during the late
nineteenth century in the writings of the British legal theorist A.V. Dicey, who
stressed that the legislature has the most substantial democratic pedigree and, thus, an
omnicompetence vis Avis the public will. See A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1959); A.V. DICEY, LECTURES
ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY 9-10 (1905). Moreover, "[a]ll governmental power should be
channeled through Parliament in order that it might be subject to legitimation and
oversight by the Commons ... If authority had been delegated to a minister to perform certain tasks upon certain conditions, the courts' function was, in the event of a
challenge, to check that only those tasks were performed and only where the condi-
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3.

The Welfare State

The dilemmas of the administrative state were exacerbated during the long tenure of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt
and his Congressional allies aggressively expanded the power of
the elected executive, asserted the hegemony of the federal government over state and local authorities, and created "the welfare
state ' 174 by providing Social Security and other benefits. 175
For those in both public administration and administrative law,
the New Deal produced a rethinking of the state's role vis-a-vis the
social and economic status of its citizens.176 Administrative law
was under pressure to recognize the legitimacy of new social programs, but change came only with great difficulty and a "courtpacking plan" that brought sympathetic justices to the Supreme
Court. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1930s, many legal scholars
who had once supported a curtailment of judicial review
to speed
17 7
role.
court
standardized
a
urged
programs
social
along
In conceptualizing a role for the courts, Judge Linde made an
observation of special pertinence to public human service
organizations:
tions were present." P.P.

CRAIG,

PUBLIC LAW AND DEMOCRACY

IN THE

UNITED

20-21 (1990). This perspective was
consistent with the development of American public law until about 1875. Common
law provided that a public official could be held personally liable for wrongdoing in
office if it could not be shown that the impetus for that wrongdoing came from positive law or orders. Id. Courts in this period, "at the behest of aggrieved citizens...
adapted the traditional writs in an effort to exert a measure of control over... administrative officials," which were few in number. BREYER ET AL., supra note 170, at 17.
174. Participants of the debate included lawyers like Dean Roscoe Pound, who
were primarily concerned with the quasi-judicial functions of government, and New
Deal supporters, who stressed the importance of policy making. See Price, supra note
138.
175. David H. Rosenbloom, 1946: Framinga Lasting CongressionalResponse to the
Administrative State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 173 (1998). In a foreshadowing of the
managerialism that was to take hold following World War II, Max Lerner argued that
"the burden of administrative innovation has fallen on the federal agencies." Max
Lerner, The Burden of Government Business, in PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW
DEMOCRACY 3-13 (Fritz Morstein-Marx ed., 1940). The "essentials of public management" were identified as information, leadership, teamwork, and administrative coordination. Id. at v. He called attention to "the assumption by public management of
social tasks that would otherwise have been left unperformed." Id. The administrative revolution involved "the creation of new administrative forms to meet new governmental objectives," "the idea of planning," and "a new attitude toward the
government service," by which he meant the disappearance of fear at "the idea of a
trained administrative elite to carry the burden of government business." Id. at 7-8.
176. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991).
177. See generally JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 152-55 (1938).
KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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When social services use both federal and local funding, agencies at both levels often have broad authority to impose requirements enforced only by loss of eligibility, which often is more
drastic than punishment. Block grants replace categorical programs for the very purpose of delegating the power to spend
federal funds with wide policy options and few federal requirements. Where are the claims that such transfers of program authority are excessive delegation?178

The reason Congress grants considerable discretion to public
managers when performing a function that "seems ...to call for
professional competence, ' 179 according to Judge Linde, is histori-

cal: executive power preceded parliamentary government and thus
provides a baseline for performing public functions.18 ° Public management is a "residue after power to regulate private affairs is

wrested from autocratic government.' ' 18 1
Influenced by the New Deal, public administration scholarship

also began focusing more carefully on the issues of discretion and
accountability. Marshall Dimock enunciated an expansive view of
the public manager's role that anticipated contemporary developments in public management theory. He observed that "[t]hose
who view administrative action as simple commands . . . fail to
comprehend the extent to which administration is called upon to
help formulate policy and to fashion important realms of discretion

in our modern democracies.'

a8 2

Yet discretion is, at minimum, a

double-edged sword. Dimock noted that "[t]he important problem

is the manner in which discretion is exercised and the safeguards
against abuse of power which are provided."' 8 3 In other words,
178. Hans A. Linde, Structures and Terms of Consent: Delegation, Discretion, Separation of Powers, Representation, Participation,Accountability?, 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
829, 831 (1999).
179. Id. at 832.
180. Id. at 834.
181. Id. Judge Linde notes "diverse structures of decision and consent" in public
administration, including delegations to non-departmental entities and even to private
contractors, purposeful insulation from political direction, and extensive variation
across the states in the organization and separation of powers. Id.

182. Dimock, supra note 168, at 127. See also

MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL

(1980); Brodkin, supra note 117.
183. Marshall Dimock, The R6le of Discretion in Modern Administration, in THE
BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES

FRONTIERS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

45-65, 60 (John Gaus, Leonard White &

Marshall Dimock eds., 1936). The exercise of discretion is far from straightforward,
argued Pendleton Herring: "The bureaucrat . . .does not suffer so much from an
inability to execute the law unhampered as from an uncertainty in direction. Where is
the official to look for guidance on the broad plain of public interest? He is hemmed
in by the immediacy of his own tasks. Within the system of which he is but a
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discretion must be exercised responsibly. It was becoming clear, in
fact, that the sword of responsibility has many edges. Observed
John Gaus:
We developed a kind of triple responsibility in our administration. Whereas responsibility to the people is enforced through
elections, and to the courts through judicial review, secured
through various forms of procedure, responsibility to the legislature... is nevertheless enforced through financial measures and
control of the establishment and organization of administration
by statutes, through legislative investigations and through the
confirmation of appointees.' 84
Within public administration, the frequently expressed argument
that the new administrative state required a different approach by
the courts became even more compelling under the New Deal. "In
general," Don Price argued, "court review of administrative decisions and orders is least useful on those aspects of a case that require discretion, the selection of one choice among several with
nearly equal advantages, or call for technical or scientific
185
qualifications."
If not the courts, or the electoral institutions, then who or what
would ensure responsibility? Within public administration, this issue came to a head in the classic debate between two Europeanborn scholars of American institutions, Carl Friedrich and Herman
Finer.' 86 Finer argued that, in a democracy, responsibility can only
be ensured through external control:
Are the servants of the public to decide their own course, or is
their course of action to be decided by a body outside themsubordinate part, his contribution to the total administrative responsibility is left

largely to his own judgment." E.

AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

PENDLETON HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

22 (1936). Herring invoked the notion of "the public

interest" as an indispensable guide to administrative judgment, a concept analogous
to due process as a standard for the judiciary. Id. at 23. Perhaps we should not abandon public law after all, he suggested. A system of administrative law might in time
indicate the limits of bureaucratic responsibility and develop the conception of public
interest. But the official today finds himself largely isolated except for the presence of
those interests directly affected by the consequences of his action. These loom largest
in the context of his administrative surroundings. Id.
184. John M. Gaus, The Responsibility of Public Administration, in THE FRONTIERS
OF PUIBLIC ADMINISTRATION 31 (John M. Gaus, Leonard D. White & Marshall E.
Dimock eds., 1936).
185. Price, supra note 138, at 492.
186. Carl J. Friedrich, Responsible Government Under the American Constitution, in
OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SERVICE 3-74 (Comm'n Inquiry on Pub. Serv.

PROBLEMS

Pers. ed., 1935); see also Herman Finer, Better Government Personnel, 51 POL. SCI. Q.
580 (1936).
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selves? My answer is that the servants of the public are not to
decide their own course; they are to be responsible to the
elected representatives of the public, and these are to determine
the course of action of the public servants to the most minute
degree that is technically feasible. [The administrative state
must confront] the dual problem of securing the responsibility of
officials, (a) through the courts and disciplinary controls within
the hierarchy of the administrative departments, and also (b)
through the authority exercised over officials by responsible
ministers based on sanctions exercised by the representative
1 87
assembly.
Friedrich, in contrast, took a dim view of the ability of courts and
legislatures to control administration:
[N]o mere reliance upon some traditional device, like cabinet
dependence upon majority support in parliament, or popular
election of the chief executive can be counted upon to render
the best public services of a modern government responsible .... At best, responsibility in a democracy will remain fragmentary because of the indistinct voice of the principal whose
agents the officials are supposed88 to be: the heterogeneous
masses composing the electorate.'
But, he said, democratic responsibility could be approximated, if
officials have the right attitude toward their work. We have a right
to call a policy irresponsible
if it can be shown that it was adopted without proper regard to
the existing sum of human knowledge concerning the technical
issues involved; we also have a right to call it irresponsible if it
can be shown that it was adopted without proper regard for existing preferences in the community, and more particularly its
prevailing majority. Consequently, the responsible administrator is one who is responsive to these two dominant factors: technical knowledge and popular sentiment. Any policy which
violates either standard, or which fails to crystallize in spite of
their urgent imperatives, renders the official responsible for it
liable to the charge of irresponsible conduct.1 89

187. Herman Finer, Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government, 1
PUB. ADMIN. REV.

188.

336 (1940).

CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THE-

ORY AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 412-13

189. Friedrich, supra note 160, at 12.

(1946).
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The check on abuse of administrative discretion, in Friedrich's
view, is professionalism. 190 Similarly, Paul Van Riper argued that

"[p]rofessionalism can often keep administrative discretion within
bounds more severe than a legislature would dare to prescribe." 191
Even if professionalism is not a substitute for either minute legislative control or judicial review, the argument is persuasive that it
contributes significantly to responsible administration, and neither
legislators nor judges should want either advertently or inadvertently to preclude its exercise.
One solution, "personnel" and "procedural elements," came to
be recognized as one of the best safeguards against the arbitrary
exercise of administrative discretion.' 92 Building on Friedrich and,
implicitly, constitutional due process, Dimock suggested an additional test: have officials followed reasonable procedures?1 93 Are
public managers formally qualified, and did they follow procedures
that preclude the abuse of power? Friedrich advocated sound personnel administration, "tight fiscal controls, and a strong sense of
professional pride and craftsmanship. "194
The issue of administrative responsibility was not to be settled by
academic debate, however. In the face of the rapidly growing role
of the federal government in society and the economy, the courts,
the President, and the Congress began vying, "almost frantically"

in the view of Bernard Schwartz, for control of the powerful resources of administration. 195 Contemporary Supreme Court rul190. According to Paul Van Riper, the idea that "professional standards and scientific objectivity become measures of administrative action, relies primarily on an internalized and voluntary pattern of behavior." VAN RIPER, supra note 153, at 550.
FRIEDRICH, supra note 188, at 413, argued that specialists with a passion for impartiality and objectivity will know when to shrink from arbitrary and rash decisions, awaiting the expression of the "will of the people."
191. VAN RIPER, supra note 153, at 550.
192. HERRING, supra note 183 at 397-99. See also LUTHER GULICK, BETTER GovERNMENT PERSONNEL (1935); LEONARD. D. WHITE, GOVERNMENT CAREER SERVICE
(1935).
193. Dimock, supra note 168, at 60-61.
194. FRIEDRICH, supra note 188, at 413.
195. Bernard Schwartz, Some Crucial Issues of Administrative Law, in HANDBOOK
OF REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 207-22, 207 (David H. Rosenbloom &
Richard D. Schwartz eds., 1994). Congress rebuffed Roosevelt's ambitions and warily
authorized a considerably reduced version of the Brownlow plan in 1939. See generally ROSENBLOOM, supra note 154. In rulings such as Carter v. Carter Coal Company,
298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); and Schecter Poultry Co. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495
(1935), the Supreme Court struck against the expansion of federal executive power.
ROSENBLOOM, supra note 154, at 14. Marshall Dimock observed that, "courts desired
specific delegations, but were unclear in expressing that desire through their holdings.
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1' 9 6
ings impressed observers as attempts to "nullify the New Deal.'
Protecting its own interests, Congress enacted the Hatch Acts of
1939197 and 1940,198 which forbade civil servants from engaging in
political activity, thus curbing the power of political executives
over the rapidly growing federal workforce.
The issue of executive control of administration came to a head
in the period surrounding the enactment and veto of the WalterLogan Bill in 1939.199 Dean Roscoe Pound had argued that administrative agencies are under none of the safeguards that characterize judicial proceedings, especially when engaged in adjudication
and acting as prosecutor and judge in the same case. °° Pound thus
advocated for stringent procedural safeguards. In contrast, supporters of the New Deal urged that, in the absence of relevant standards, narrow procedural safeguards and private law values were
an inadequate basis for defining administrative jurisdiction and
responsibility.
Inspired by anti-New Deal sentiment, Congress enacted the Walter-Logan bill, which established "a single rigid method for the issuing of regulations. ' 20 1 President Roosevelt vetoed it, calling it
the result of "repeated efforts by a combination of lawyers who
desire to have all the processes of government conducted through
202
lawsuits and of interests which desire to escape regulation.
However, he responded to the sentiment behind the bill by appointing the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure to study procedural reform of administrative law. The
Governor of New York appointed Robert Benjamin to do the same
thing. The resulting reports "agreed that the courts could not do
the job the administrative agencies were doing, and that the administrative agencies themselves could not do it if anyone made them
imitate the courts. 2 3 Academic literature supported this view.20 4

The non-delegation doctrine was beginning to unravel. Dimock, supra note 168, at 5354.
196. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 154, at 15.
197. Hatch Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 252, 53 Stat. 1147.
198. Hatch Act of 1940, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 787.
199. H.R. 6324, 76th Cong. (1939).
200. ROSCOE POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: ITS GROWTH, PROCEDURE, AND SIGNIFICANCE 31 (1942).
201. Price, supra note 138, at 484.
202. BREYER ET AL., supra note 170, at 22.
203. Id. at 485.
204. See generally JEROME FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS (1930); see also WALTER
GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (1941); LANDIS, supra note
177. According to John Rohr, the AGR was "trying to curb administrative agencies
without destroying the integrity of the administrative process. The Walter-Logan Act
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By World War II, then, modernization had given rise to a new

politics, a new governance, a new public management, and a new
dilemma: reconciling the growing need for administrative capacity
with the increasingly controversial need for democratic control.

Control of bureaucracy moved to the center of American politics.
Paul Appleby stated that "[p]erhaps there is no single problem in
public administration of moment equal to the reconciliation of the

increasing5 dependence upon experts with an enduring democratic
20
reality.
At the beginning of chapter twenty of his 1926 textbook, Leonard White placed two epigrams:
"Increased administrative powers call for increased safeguards
against their abuses, and as long as there is the possibility of
official error, partiality or excess of zeal, the protection of private right is as important an object as the effectuation of some
governmental policy." Ernest Freund
"What needs emphasis is no longer the inherent natural rights of
the individual, but the importance, indeed the necessity, of administrative efficiency. For upon administrative efficiency dedid not fret over making administrative agencies wards of the court." ROHR, supra
note 106, at 165. Rather, what was required was "[i]ndependent judicial determination of the facts." ROHR, supra note 106, at 51 (quoting LANDIS, supra note 177, at
256). In reviewing the Congressional enactment and Presidential veto of the WalterLogan bill, Don Price noted that the debate was on "the margins of the problem [of
administration]." Price, supra note 138, at 492. By this he meant that the discussion of
judicial control of administration tended to focus on agencies that issue rules and
adjudicate private rights through formal administrative procedure, whereas the role of
government is becoming "more dynamic and more diversified," requiring "dispatch
and flexibility" in administration. Id. For regulatory agencies, the proposition that
behavior is safeguarded by their imitating courts was at least arguable. Id. However,
Price argued, for the New Deal agencies, administrative behavior is better safeguarded by the authority of the legislature to punish departures from legislative intent
than by enforced conformity to judicial procedure. Id.
205. PAUL APPLEBY, MORALITY AND ADMINISTRATION IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERN-

145 (1952). PENDLETON HERRING, supra note 183, at 386, observed that "[li]aws
are now more and more frequently formulated in the administrative offices .... This
MENT

shift makes a responsible bureaucracy all the more urgent." Frederick Mosher has
nicely summarized the structural difficulty of balancing capacity with accountability in
the modern government that the New Deal represented. FREDERICK C. MOSHER, DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE

(1968). He said: "[r]eliance on popularly elected

representatives is one step removed from direct participative democracy. A second
step occurs when officers so chosen select and delegate powers to other officers, appointed and removable by them .... A third step away from direct democracy is

taken with the designation of personnel who.., are protected from removal on political grounds." Id. at 3. He states the central and underlying problem as this: "how can
a public service so constituted be made to operate in a manner compatible with democracy?" Id. Or, more succinctly, "How does one square a permanent civil service ...

with the principle of government 'by the people'?" Id. at 5.
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pends the effectiveness of that social control without which
healthy development in existing conditions is impossible." Frank
J. Goodnow.
Thus, he implied, the issue had already been joined: how shall we
balance individual justice (control) and collective justice (capacity)? By the end of the New Deal, the terms of the debate were
essentially the same in both administrative law and public administration. In 1940, James M. Landis identified the crucial issues in
administrative law as, first, the subjection of the federal bureaucracy to a general administrative procedures statute and, second,
the proper scope of judicial review.2 °6 In the same year, Fritz Morstein Marx, defining administrative responsibility as "the restraint
of power, made concrete through sharp delimitations and the counterpoise of constitutionally guaranteed rights of the individual, ' 20 7
argued that Constitutional boundaries "must retain a considerable
degree of flexibility lest the institutional order become so rigid that
it cannot accommodate the pressures of social change. ' 208
The question facing both public administration and administrative law had become increasingly urgent: in a federal administrative state of separated powers, how can responsible administration
be ensured? With respect to the increasingly significant public responsibilities governed by "competing social forces, ' 20 9 how can a
system of administrative law combined with judicial review operate
in such a way that their combined effect is to sustain rather than
undermine the managerial professionalism and trust now widely
recognized as essential to collective justice?
4. Reinventing Governance
If issues of administrative responsibility had seemed clearly
drawn in 1940, the intellectual environment has become more fragmented and unfocused since. The question of ensuring managerial
responsibility has meandered across contested and increasingly
206. Schwartz, supra note 195, at 207 (quoting James M. Landis, Crucial Issues in

Administrative Law, 1077 HARV. L. REV. 53 (1940)).
207. Fritz Morstein Marx, Administrative Responsibility, in
ADMINISTRATION 220 (Fritz Morstein-Marx ed., 1959).

ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC

208. Id. at 222-23. In his view, judicial surveillance had not strengthened administrative responsibility; "it had rather the opposite effect." Id. at 232. Nor were legislative enactments definitive: "neither the statute nor the budget can attempt to outline
specifically the path of administrative action." Id. at 247. Administrative responsibility, Morstein Marx concluded, "develops best in an atmosphere of professionalism,"
i.e., of a neutrality toward partisan objectives which is the reverse side of a dedication
to the public interest. Id. at 250.
209. See DICKINSON, supra note 125, at 218.
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partisan ideological terrain with little compelling intellectual
guidance.
Under assault within political science and heavily influenced by
behavioralism,2 1 ° public administration abandoned the logic of sci-

entifically managed bureaucracy. Emphasis moved away from institutions toward public managers as decision makers and political
actors. The pre-New Deal "New Management

'2 11

has been trans-

formed into the increasingly popular notion of a customer-focused
"New Public Management" and its variants.21 2 Contributing to this

trend has been the fact that attitudes towards government have
shifted toward skepticism.2 13 The public and its elected representatives no longer view the administrative state and its bureaucracy as
the preferred mechanism for reconciling the need for governmental capacity with the correlative need to ensure its accountability to
the public.
5.

From the APA to Chevron

In 1946, an emboldened Congress enacted a series of laws, including the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")2 14 that tied the

administrative state more tightly to American democratic constitutionalism.2 1 5 As an unintended consequence, these postwar enact-

ments ratified the hegemony of the welfare state, heightening the
bargaining between legislators and administrators, a process subject to legislative oversight that ranged in character from conscientious to promiscuous and opportunistic.2t 6
210. Pioneered at the University of Chicago, behavioralism championed a move
from the study of socio-political institutions to individual behavior. See BARRY D.
KARL, CHARLES E. MERRIAM AND THE STUDY OF POLITICS 199 (1974).
211. See WHITE, supra note 133.
212. See Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., The New Public Management: How to Transform a
Theme Into A Legacy, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 231 (1998); Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., The
New Public Management as an InternationalPhenomenon: A Skeptical View, 1 INT'L
PUB. MGMT. J. 1 (1997).
213. Garvey, supra note 104.
214. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5

U.S.C. § 551).
215. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 154, at 15. See also Rosenbloom, supra note 175.
The APA provided for public notification and the opportunity to comment on proposed administrative rules; due process protections in administrative adjudications;
and court interventions in the event that agency actions are found to be arbitrary or
capricious, to constitute abuses of discretion, to exceed jurisdiction or authority, to
violate procedural requirements, and action unsupported by substantial evidence or
unwarranted by the facts.
216. ROSEBLOOM, supra note 154, at 20. Leonard White observed in 1948, two
years following the enactment of the APA, that "it is actually impossible to state any
general conclusions as to the actual extent or limits of court review of official deci-
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Expansion of administrative authority at all levels of government
in the last half century has heightened concern for protecting citizens against abuses of administrative discretion. For example, concern began to focus on the legal position of the individual
dependent upon government largesse. Largesse was initially held
to be a privilege insulated from the requirements of due process.
In 1970, the Supreme Court in Goldberg introduced the concept of
entitlement, which is "more like 'property' than a 'gratuity"' and,
217
as such, is fully protected by procedural due process.

Over the next thirty years, a dramatic increase in the number
and size of government bureaucracies invited an outpouring of lawsuits based on constitutional guarantees found during the "rights
revolution." Federal courts began articulating numerous constitutional protections for individuals interacting with the administrative state. Protection was thought necessary from actions of the
state. The legal concept of standing was liberalized to permit a
wide range of actions against government agencies. The legislature
began incorporating measures into organic statutes that ensured
the "representativeness" of bureaucracy, in effect establishing interest-based political property rights in public administration.218
President Roosevelt's concern in the Walter-Logan debates that
governance might be performed at the bar seemed more real than
ever.
Administrative law itself has tended to skirt challenges to the
legitimacy of the managerial role in human service agencies from
rights-based litigation, however. Debates over non-delegation and
administrative discretion have questioned how to decide individual
cases, not how to ensure collective justice.2 19 Although acknowlsions."

LEONARD D. WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRA-

TION 577 (3d ed. 1950). The Administrative Procedures Act was a compromise

between New Dealers who had engineered the veto of the Walter-Logan Bill in 1940
and the Attorney General's commission that made its report in 1941. This compromise was respected by the courts interpreting the ADA. See LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965). Price observes that fears concerning
APA rigidity proved unfounded and that the debate became less dogmatic as liberals
came to fear administrative decision making in rights issues and conservatives began
to distrust the courts as protectors of their interests. Price, supra note 138.
217. See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
218. For an eloquent discussion, see THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM;
IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1969).

219. Judge Linde, supra note 178, at 829, notes that "Professor David Schoenbrod,
a recent proponent of a strong nondelegation doctrine, explicitly confines his argument to the enactment of 'rules of private conduct' and excludes the pursuit of governmental programs by managing public funding or property." Excluded from
Kenneth Davis's 1969 essay on discretionary justice, for example, were "broad policy-
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edging policy-making that takes the form of "generalizations that
go beyond particular cases" and determinations "thought to be
unique or nonrecurring so that generalization is inappropriate, 22 °
theorists of administrative law have tended, now as before World
War II, to ignore these aspects of governance.
A watershed in administrative law bearing on these issues appears to have been inadvertent. In Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,221 the Supreme Court finally established
that, in the absence of clear legislative direction, an administrative
agency "could legitimately adopt any plausible interpretation of a
statute it was charged with enforcing. '222 Absent a clear expression of legislative intent, the role of the courts was to determine the
plausibility or reasonableness of agency interpretations, not their
correctness. At last, the Court appeared to recognize the impropriety of using traditional methods of statutory interpretation in those
ubiquitous matters in which, in effect, there is no law to find.
The controversies created by the Chevron doctrine recall debates
over the Walter-Logan bill. 23 Bernard Schwartz argues that Chevron "upsets the balance in our administrative law" by risking "un'224
due deference to self-expansion of an agency's jurisdiction.
Cass Sunstein has argued that "the notion that administrators may
interpret statutes they administer is inconsistent with separationof-powers principles. 2 2 5 Such principled objections to the Chevron doctrine do not, however, address the technical, procedural,
and ethical dilemmas inherent in fulfilling the sovereign will, given
concrete expression in statutes, to address wicked problems in a
responsible way through the imperfect personnel and administrative technologies of the administrative state.
The central tension between the extent to which public officials
are granted discretion to perform their duties within a legislated
making, as distinguished from deciding individual cases" and "social justice, that is,
justice for segments of the population, as distinguished from justice for individual
parties." DAVIS, supra note 125, at 6. He further notes: "Discretionary justice obviously overlaps with policy-making, because the central part of each is a determination
of what is desirable, but the two concepts are nevertheless quite different. All policymaking, by its intrinsic nature, is discretionary, but only a part of it has to do with
justice." Id.
220. Id. at 7.
221. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
222. ROSENBLOOM, supra note 154, at 25.
223. Compare Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Agency Interpretationsof Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511 with Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986).
224. Schwartz, supra note 195, at 214-15.
225. CAss SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 143 (1990).
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framework, on the one hand, and the control by law of bureaucratic discretion, on the other remains. 26 Myriad decisions about
particular matters of public policy "have so much potential for adversely affecting individual interests that it seems undesirable to
leave them entirely to the discretion of a handful of government
officials.

'2 27

When, then, is discretion appropriate?

In its broadest sense, discretion exists when no single correct
choice is imposed on administrators, allowing them to base decisions on policy considerations. But the law typically enacts mechanisms for supervising and evaluating the exercise of discretion.
Shapiro states that "there is a general tendency to narrow the
boundaries of discretion over time, partly by substituting rules for
discretion and partly by introducing various devices that permit at
least an ex post auditing of the prudence of the decisions
reached.''228 These mechanisms 229 are numerous: establishing pro-

fessional qualifications for office holders; requiring statistical postaudits; supplying budgetary authority; enacting statutes, including
statutes to correct judicial discretion; creating procedures to insure
greater public observation of private, informal action by public officials; and permitting discretion to waive rules or make exceptions,
a form of discretion difficult to protect from abuse. For Shapiro,
"[t]he attempt to control discretion while purportedly leaving 'political' or 'policy' choice unfettered has largely taken the form of
piling up procedural requirements.

'230

This approach, termed legal idealism by Jerry Mashaw,23' offers
a coherent normative rationale for the particular forms that governance can assume: insuring the legitimacy of official actions
through the formal control of bureaucratic discretion, where legitimacy is defined by judicial doctrines and canons. It is significant
226. Martin M. Shapiro, HANDBOOK OF REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
501 (David H. Rosenbloom & Richard D. Schwartz eds., 1994).
227. Id. at 507.
228. Id. at 504.
229. The term "mechanism" is also used by economists to characterize specific
techniques, such as contract design when adverse selection is the issue, procedures for
disclosure of information, rules governing decision making, and the like that are intended to achieve particular results or results that have desirable properties. See generally DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1990); Terry M.
Moe, The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in
ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT AND BEYOND

116-53 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1990). Mechanism is thus synonymous with the
term "instrument."
230. Shapiro, supra note 226, at 506.
231. Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process:Normative, Positive, and
Critical Stories of Legal Development, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 267 (1990).
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that this rationale is the stock in trade of legislators who have been
trained as lawyers. But the very real challenge to the prospects for
responsible administration is ignored. Sociologist James Coleman
argued that a "bureaucratic personality" results when "[r]igidity
and attention to rules are pursued by a bureaucrat as a policy that
is safe, because, whatever the outcome, he is protected by having
followed the rules; an action against the rules but having a better
outcome for the organization would expose the bureaucrat to loss
of position or other discipline if it was not successful. ' 232 Staffing
the administrative state with only bureaucratic personalities surely
cannot be the goal of any branch of government.
6. From Management as Science to Management as Craft
Self-assured at the height of the New Deal, public administration
was maneuvered into a defensive posture by developments in administrative law, social science, and public attitudes.233 A seeming
casualty, adumbrated by the Friedrich-Finer debate, was the heretofore coherent logic of managerial responsibility. Public administration began offering a wide menu of approaches to managerial
responsibility, each suffering from conceptual vagueness.
Emmette Redford summarized the pre-war logic in his 1958
book, Ideal and Practice in Public Administration.234 He argued
that although administration is circumscribed by law, discretion is
vital to its performance. Discretion, according to Redford, is necessary in administration, because law is rigid, and policy must be
made pragmatically.235 Integrated and hierarchical structures, he
argued, are essential to ensuring that bureaucracy is subject to control from outside. 236 In other words, exercising authority over subordinates is not anti-democratic but the opposite.237
232. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 80 (1990). See also
Richard D. White, Jr., OrganizationalDesign and Ethics: The Effects of Rigid Hierarchy on Moral Reasoning, 2 INT'L J. ORG. THEORY & BEHAV. 431 (1999) (citing an
empirical study showing how the rigidity of hierarchy saps the quality of employees'
moral reasoning).
233. See supra notes 175-209 and accompanying text.
234. EMMETrE REDFORD, IDEAL AND PRACTICE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
(1958).
235. Id. at 43.
236. Id. at 79.
237. Id. at 89; Redford noted Finer's view that Congress should control bureaucracy "to the most minute degree that is technically feasible" but prefers Charles
Hyneman's contrary view that Congress "should not define and describe a governmental undertaking in such detail that administrative officials are rendered incapable
of achieving the major objectives toward which the legislation is directed." HYNEMAN,
supra note 105, at 85.
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Though the concept of public will or public interest has always
been central to public administration,238 scholars began elaborating
on its overriding normative importance to managerial behavior.
For example, John Rohr urges that "[a]dministrators should use
their discretionary power in order to maintain the constitutional
balance of powers in support of individual rights. ' 239 Robert Denhardt urges administrators to commit themselves to "values that
relate to the concepts of freedom, justice, and the public interest. '24 0 Gary Wamsley argues that
[t]he only possible source of governing impetuses that might
keep our complex political system from either a dangerous concentration of power on the one hand, or impotence or self-destruction on the other, is a public administration with the
and legitinecessary professionalism, dedication, self-esteem,
24 1
macy to act as the constitutionalcenter of gravity.
Such views imply that administration represents the practice of a
secular religion rather than a professional craft obedient to the
panoply of democratic institutions.242
A pragmatic view of administrative morality is that of Frederick
Mosher. The threats to objective responsibility, Mosher suggests,
are not in politics, as others imply, but in "both professionalization
and unionization with their narrower objectives and their foci upon
the welfare and advancement of their members. '243 As for representativeness, "who represents that majority of citizens who are
not in any [represented group or interest]?" 244 Mosher argues that
"[t]he harder and infinitely more important issue of administrative
morality today attends the reaching of decisions on questions of
public policy which involve competitions in loyalty and perspective
between broad goals of the polity.., and the narrower goals of a
group, bureau, clientele, or union. "245
238. See generally GOODNOW, supra note 131.
239. ROHR, supra note 106, at 181.

240. ROBERT B. DENHARDT, THE PURSUIT OF SIGNIFICANCE: STRATEGIES FOR
MANAGERIAL SUCCESS IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS 20 (1993).
241. Gary L. Wamsley, Introduction to REFOUNDING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 1929, 26 (Gary L. Wamsley et al. eds., 1990) (emphasis added).
242. Of the views that responsibility defined as political accountability, Paul Van
Riper noted that "our traditional tendency has been to deplore its existence." VAN
RIPER, supra note 153, at 549. He notes further, "such an approach is futile unless
accompanied by a simultaneous willingness to abolish many of the functions now performed by the federal government." Id. at 549.
243. FREDERICK C. MOSHER, DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE 209 (1968).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 210.
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Within mainstream scholarship, however, the emphasis appeared
to shift from "administration" to "public," from politics to institutionalism, from the department or bureau as the unit of analysis
and administration as design and maintenance of functional organization, to the manager as a natural person, and to management as
craft, as purposeful, policy-oriented behavior.246 Retreating from
universalistic, "scientific" principles of management, administrative
scholarship has paid increasing attention to the consequential differences between public and private management. It is within this
context that the actor-focused idea of public management as craft
has emerged.247
Such shifts of emphasis have the unintentional effect of facilitating our ability to address the issue of managerial responsibility as it
tends to be viewed by the courts. Managerial actors, their behavior, their motivations, and their liability have moved to the foreground of public administration. The formerly abstract concepts of
discretion and responsibility have become increasingly concrete,
identified with particular actors and functions, depicting behavior
susceptible to judicial review.
The scaffolding of a separation between politics and policy, on
the one hand, and administration on the other has been torn
down. 48 Paul Appleby defined public administration as "that intermingling of policy-making and management which occurs below
the levels of legislative, judicial, and popular-electoral policy determinations. ' 249 He discussed executive work as what to do and how
to do it. In an extended discussion of administrative responsibility,
he argued that "[r]estraints upon the exercise of authority are in
some respects managerial," by which he meant concerned with effectiveness and pragmatic accountability to political institutions
and processes.25°
246. See generally Garvey, supra note 104; WALDO, supra note 154; Roscoe C. Martin, Paul H. Appleby and his Administrative World, in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND
DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PAUL H. APPLEBY 1-14, 9 (Roscoe C. Martin
ed., 1965).
247. See LAURENCE E. LYNN, JR., PUBLIC MANAGEMENT As ART, SCIENCE, AND
PROFESSION 34-40 (1996), for additional discussion of the emergence of contemporary
perspectives on public management.
248. PAUL H. APPLEBY, POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 24 (1949). "The intermingling of policy and administration in our government is not new," said Paul Appleby.
Id. "It is more visible because both policy and administration are more visible; both
have to do with many more things." Id.
249. Id. at 25.
250. APPLEBY, supra note 205, at 239. An Inter-University Case program was created in 1951, and in 1952, Public Administration and Policy Development: A Case
Book, edited by Harold Stein, was published in order to permit students "to study
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An intellectual development that was to have seminal importance was the appearance in 1938 of Chester Barnard's The Functions of the Executive, which laid the groundwork for new
perspectives on managerial responsibility.2 1 As Frederick Mosher
interpreted him, Barnard "defined administrative responsibility as
primarily a moral question or, more specifically, as the resolution
of competing and conflicting codes, legal, technical, personal, professional, and organizational, in the reaching of individual decisions. ''2 52 The notion of the manager as a morally responsible
decision maker was to influence the thinking of Herbert Simon,
whose 1947 book Administrative Behavior 53 and textbook (with

Victor A. Thompson and Donald W. Smithburg), 54 became classics of post-war public administration literature that have influenced generations of public administration scholarship. 55 With
Barnard as a model, subsequent literature of public administration
began to pay closer attention to the function and role of agency
management, to the pre-conditions for managerial effectiveness,
and to the issue of managerial responsibility in the democratic
state.256
some of the characteristic modes of behavior of public administrators ..

as they go

about their task of making decisions." PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT: A CASE BOOK ix (Harold Stein ed., 1952). A historical account of the use of
teaching cases in public administration appears at id. at xxxviii-xlv.
251. CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCrIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (1938). See also
PAUL APPLEBY, POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

250 (1949) (noting that "[t]he central-

ization of responsibility, which Americans seem to fear, permits and requires the delegation of responsibility and the magnifying of the moral forces by which, primarily, I
think, bureaucracy can be controlled" (quoting BARNARD, supra)). According to one
scholar, Barnard's goal was "to legitimize the new American managerial class." William G. Scott, Barnard, Chester L, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 170 (Jay M. Shafritz ed., 1998).
252. MOSHER, supra note 205, at 210. See also Barnard, supra note 251, at ch. XVII.

253.
254.

HERBERT
HERBERT

A.
A.

SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1947).
SIMON, VICTrOR A. THOMPSON & DONALD W. SMITHBURG, PUB-

LIC ADMINISTRATION (1950).

255. Scott, supra note 251, at 171.
256. In Morality and Administration in Democratic Government, Paul Appleby argued that traditional protections against immorality in administration, checks and balances, decentralization, federalism, and others, are less than effective, even negative.
APPLEBY, supra note 205. Advocating exposing more areas of administration to general political responsibility and hierarchy, not as a basis of authority (on which he
cites Barnard as having similar view, id. at 205, but as "a means to broaden the perspective for, and the responsibility of, decision." Id. at 212. Both Appleby and Mosher feared career systems and expertise as threats to moral administration. In
Rowland Egger's interpretation, Appleby saw the crux of responsibility as beginning
at the point at which statutory authorities, policy directives, and standard operating
procedures confront the notion of the public interest. Rowland Egger, Responsibility
in Administration:An Exploratory Essay, in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOC-
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In his 1954 book, Management in the Public Service, for example,
John Millett argued that
[t]he challenge to any administrator is to overcome obstacles, to
understand and master problems, to use imagination and insight
in devising new goals of public service. No able administrator
can be content to be simply a good caretaker. He seeks rather
to review the ends of organized effort and to advance the goals
25 7
of administrative endeavor toward better public service.
But, Millett continues,
In a democratic society this questing is not guided solely by the
administrator's own personal sense of desirable social ends. The
administrator must convince others as well. He must work with
interest groups, with legislators, with chief executives, and with
the personnel of his own agency to convince them all that a particular line of policy or program is desirable.2
The concept of administrative rationality received a new dimension with the advent of the policy analysis as an administrative
technology in the 1960s and early 1970s.25 9 Opportunistically as-

sembling rudiments of authority, knowledge, technical skill and application accumulating with the emergence of the modern
administrative state, well-positioned Federal executives forged new
structural links between research-based knowledge and policy
making.260 The advent of policy analysis as an administrative techIN HONOR OF PAUL H. APPLEBY 299-329, 310-11 (Roscoe C. Martin
ed., 1965). In Egger's view, Appleby never defined what he meant by "the public
interest" although it was integral to his concept of responsibility. Id.
257. JOHN D. MILLETT, MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE: THE QUEST FOR
RACY: ESSAYS

EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE

401 (1954).

258. Id.
259. According To Donald C. Stone, "the analytical approach to American public
administration had its origin in the establishment of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research in 1906." Donald C. Stone, Applying Management Knowledge, in ELEMENTS

OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

406-34, 406 (Fritz Morstein Marx ed., 2d ed.

1959). In a contemporaneous formulation, Lane defined policy analysis as "the answers to the question: What happens when we intervene in the social system this way
rather than that and why?" Robert Lane, Integration of PoliticalScience and the Other

Social Sciences Through Policy Analysis, in INTEGRATION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
THROUGH POLICY ANALYSIS 71-87, 71 ( J.Charlesworth ed., 1972).
260. The deliberate use of scientists and science-based information to inform public
policy making and implementation is hardly a recent phenomenon. See Laurence E.
Lynn, Jr., Policy Analysis in the Bureaucracy:How new? How effective?, 8 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 373 (1989). Previously, however, such uses had been more or

less restricted to particular instances and were not necessarily a normal feature of
policy making. The movement to bring "policy sciences" to bear on policy making
began to take form in 1951, initiated by Harold Lasswell and his colleagues. See, e.g.,
THE POLICY SCIENCES 4 (Daniel Lerner & Harold D. Lasswell eds., 1951) (describing
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the culmination of two trends originating during the
Progressive era: movements toward management by qualified manthe centralization of administrative
agers and experts and toward
262
nology 261 was

power in executive

7.

offices.

Where Mighty Forces Contend

As the rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s gained force,
public administration become infused with policy making. "Public
administration is policy-making," argued Paul Appleby. 63 However, he said,
[I]t is not autonomous, exclusive or isolated policy-making. It is
policy-making on a field where mighty forces contend, forces engendered in and by the society. It is policy-making subject to
still other and various policy-makers. Public administration is
one of a number of basic political processes by which this people
achieves and controls governance . . . . The requirement is
for... a pattern [of responsibility] subtle, flexible, and differentiated in its attenuations but firm at its axis, a pattern notably at
involved in the larger
its axis and variously at its attenuations
264
pattern of politics and governance.,
the importance of integrating scientific methods into the study of policy-making). Academic social scientists had begun to address the needs of democratic states for systematic information to inform their deliberations, albeit with a far different purpose
in mind than facilitating bureaucratic decision making.
261. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., A Place at the Table: Policy Analysis, Its Postpositive
Critics,and the Future of Practice,18 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 411 (1999). The
term "administrative technology" refers to such replicable methods as merit-based
personnel selection, executive budgeting, the administrative department or bureau,
regulation and rule making, the executive order, the categorical program, formula
grants and block grants, the administrative procedures act, performance audits, and
policy analysis.
262. This new movement brought together knowledge derived from recent developments in systems, management, design, and economic sciences on behalf of responsibility in administrative leadership and efficiency in resource allocation: tools for
managing complexity, identifying and solving problems, and allocating resources for
maximum effect. Such tools were thought likely to be most effectively wielded by
administrators with discretion to propose, decide on, and implement actions to be
taken by others in pursuit of the goals of public policy. As an administrative technology, the proper role of social-science-based policy analysis is improving the basis on
which policy decisions are made, whether by legislators, executives, or administrators,
by employing theory, empirical knowledge and analytic craftsmanship to clarify issues, alternatives, and consequences in a precise and dispassionate way, a role no one
else in politics is likely to perform. See LAURENCE E. LYNN, JR., MANAGING PUBLIC
POLICY

263.
264.

171 (1987).
APPLEBY,
APPLEBY,

supra note 248, at 170.
supra note 205, at 219.
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These forces contend, moreover, not only at the highest levels of
administration but at its working levels as well.
How can the courts play a more constructive role in promoting
managerial responsibility essential to good government in our constitutional order, where mighty forces contend? A professional
precept of managerial responsibility appropriate for the exercise of
administrative discretion is to found not in abstract ethical or
moral doctrines but in the reflections and interpretations of American administrative experience we have just reviewed.
G.

A Precept of Managerial Responsibility
The idea that public administration must be responsible is a shining thread in the literature of public administration. For Frederick
Mosher, "[r]esponsibility may well be the most important word in
all the vocabulary of administration, public and private. '26 5 Responsibility, he said, "would seem to me to be the first requisite of
a democratic state. ' '2 66 How do we know responsible public administration when we see it?
To Mosher, responsibility has two shades of meaning. The first is
objective responsibility - policies, as the expressed will of the people, are to be carried out whether the administrator likes them or
not. This kind of responsibility is essential to reliable, predictable
governance. The second is subjective responsibility - identification, loyalty, and conscience which introduces the inevitability of
competition and conflict among responsibilities. 67 Responsibility,
in other words, has both external and internal dimensions. The responsible administrator is guided both by politics and by professionalism. Although public management doctrine has evolved
265.

MOSHER, supra note 160, at 7.
266. Frederick C. Mosher, PublicAdministration Old and New: A Letter from Frederick C. Mosher, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 201 (1992). Among Morstein
Marx's four essentials of administration is responsibility. Morstein Marx, supra note
207, at 43. In Chapter 3, "The Essentials of Administration," he lists four: "(1) the

essential of rationality, (2) the essential of responsibility, (3) the essential of competence, and (4) the essential of continuity." Id. at 34. Responsibility has several as-

pects: institutional, public, and personal. Id. Competence comprises education,
training, and experience. Continuity is associated with stability and with the status of
the civil service, legal and otherwise. Id. "In structures as elaborate and hence as rich
in opportunities for obstruction as is large scale organization," he argues, "control
could not accomplish co-ordination in the interplay of human wills." Id. Control requires as well "well-formed habits of deference sustained by reason." Id.
267. MOSHER, supra note 205, at 7-8. Modern developments in professionalism and
specialization have led Mosher to side with Friedrich, supra note 183, at 63-64. Mosher notes that subjective responsibility is addressed by how well bureaucracy represents the public interest.
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from its Progressive and New Deal foundations to the more behaviorally-oriented versions of recent years, the indicators of responsible public management necessarily reflect the continuing effort to
reconcile the sophisticated demands for organization and performance of the modern state with the Madisonian ideal of constitutionally-constrained executive power: to reconcile capacity with
control, administrative discretion with a political and legal check
on its exercise.
We argue that responsible public management entails four qualities: (1) accountability, (2) judgment, (3) balance, and (4) rationality. These qualities collectively constitute a precept of managerial
responsibility.268 Responsible public administration must incorporate such a precept at every level of managerial responsibilities.
In the remainder of this section, we show how these elements of
responsibility are derived from professional scholarship and
practice.
1. Accountability
Accountability can be defined as those methods, procedures, and
forces that determine what values are reflected in administrative
decisions.2 69 This formulation is our point of departure for adducing accountability-an external dimension-as a quality of responsible management.
Judicial decisions, statutes, and administrative -rules and guidelines are the three principle formal controls over the values reflected in administration. Accountability is complicated by the fact
that all three branches compete for control of administration. 270
As a result, accountability in human service agencies has become
as complex as that of any agency in the administrative state. Large
268. Maas and Radway, supra note 13, advanced the following criteria: responsibility for exercising discretion in the formulation as well as execution of public policy;
responsibility to organized interest groups; and responsibility to the legislature
through the chief executive, involving coordination with other executive agencies.
These criteria are, the authors noted, incomplete.
269. SIMON, THOMPSON & SMITHBURG, supra note 254, at 513. Carl Friedrich observed that "[m]odern constitutionalism is essentially an effort to produce responsible
conduct of public affairs without religious sanction." CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND
AMERICA 398 (1946). See supra text accompanying note 189.

270. See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure
and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); see also Matthew. D. McCubbins &
Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire
Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. Sci. 165 (1984).
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numbers of "street level" employees and private contractors provide services at dispersed locations under burdensome, often conflicting statutory, executive, and judicial mandates, and under the
pressure of competing,
often urgently expressed citizen interests
27 1
values.
and
The density of such controls and interests may be thought to insure democratic control of administration. It is easy to show, however, that in regimes with multiple, complex goals, principals lose
control of agents, who are able to redeploy their efforts among various goals in accordance with their own interests without being
held to strict account by any one of them. 272 Of the three branches,
"no one, nor all three jointly, provide the administrator with the
totality of the value premises that enter into his decision. ' 273 The
internal dimension of values also comes into play.
In general, no regime of rules can eliminate possibilities for selfinterested behavior by subordinate officials. 274 Nonetheless,
"[m]anagement guided by [the value of responsible performance]
abhors the idea of arbitrary authority present in its own wisdom
275
and recognizes the reality of external direction and constraint.
Charles Hyneman argued, "I am sure that the administrative official cannot obtain from the political branches of the government all
of the guidance he needs. '276 But, Hyneman insisted, the other
methods for obtaining guidance must supplement, not replace or
supplant, political direction: "[t]he American people have author'277
ized nobody except their elected officials to speak for them.
Emmette Redford called external guidance "directive activity," i.e.,
activity that establishes purposes, organizations, and rules of administration. Directive activity involves "setting the preconditions
of administration on the basis of some 278
measure of [political] consensus on what will be expected of it."
Directive activity is definitive when the intent of positive law is
clear. When it is ambiguous or incomplete, the public manager
271. See LIPSKY, supra note 182; Hargrove and Glidewell, supra note 140.
272. See Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-AgentAnalyses:
Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 24
(1991); Paul R. Milgrom, Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, Efficient OrganizationalDesign, 96 J. POL. ECON. 42 (1988).
273. SIMON, THOMPSON & SMITHBURG, supra note 254, at 539.
274. MILLER, supra note 141.
275. MILLETr, supra note 257, at 403.
276. HYNEMAN, supra note 105.
277. Id.
278. EMMETTE S. REDFORD, DEMOCRACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 193
(1969).
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must exercise judgement concerning what the public interest and
professionalism may require.
2. Judgment
After all directive activity is taken into account, administrators
have considerable freedom to make decisions based on their own
ethical promptings. 279 No mechanisms for enforcing administrative
responsibility can extinguish the element of judgment from public
management. The formal establishment of accountability intentionally leaves a significant residual of discretion to public officials.28 ° Citizens, elected officials, and the courts, however, are
entitled to assurance that officials use good judgment in exercising
that discretion.
To minimize the consequences of poor judgment, constitutional
separation of powers guards against the undue influence of any single branch. When administrative agencies possessed little significant power, as in the pre-bureaucratic state, their possible abuses
aroused little concern. With the emergence of the modern administrative state, a new issue arose: what if there is too little power in
the hands of agencies legally obligated to ensure collective justice?
The need for administrators to exercise discretion not constitutionally furnished gives rise to the enduring issue of assuring good
judgment in policy making and implementation.281 Says Schuyler
B. Wallace: "the exact degree of autonomy which should be
granted to each operating unit, the work of which is neither purely
routine nor quasi-judicial in nature, will and should be determined
by reference to the primary purpose of Congress in establishing the
unit, or by reference to some ideal purpose more comprehensive
279. SIMON, THOMPSON & SMITHBURG, supra note 254, at 539.
280. Game theoretic analysis of interactions between political actors within a given
regime of rules and payoffs reveals the existence of multiple equilibria. Discretionary
actions by these actors select the actual equilibrium.
281. "The ultimate act of discretion," says Redford, "is often in the decision
whether to follow or not to follow an existing standard ....[A]dministration may be
in a good position to use discretion in the modification and refinement of rules so that
justice may be particularized." REDFORD, supra note 234, at 44, 47. Cornelius Kerwin
argues that "Once all the sources of agencies' legal authorities and obligations are
accounted for, a framework [is needed to] take account of the means by which agencies come to understand what these legal responsibilities require them to accomplish.
Three of the most important decisions that administrators make are (1) What must be
done? (2) What is the priority order of the tasks to be performed? (3) What activities
will be delayed or removed entirely from the agenda?" Cornelius M. Kerwin, Public
Law and Public Management, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC LAW AND ADMINISTRATION
30 (1997).
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than that of Congress. "282 Colin Diver has recognized the importance of judgment in the context of judicial review. He argues that
a "strong presumption of deference to interpretations lying within
an agency's prima facie policymaking domain best accommodates
the competing demands for responsibility and initiative in the administrative state.

'28 3

Responsible judgment is more likely to re-

sult, and the rigidity of the bureaucratic personality is least likely to
become troubling, when public managers are assumed to be capable of exercising it within the domain of their legislative mandates.
Beyond being accountable to directive activity, then, responsible
public management means exercising good judgment. That judgment has been exercised in the absence of definitive rules is not a
sign of regime failure. It is a sign, rather, that administrators recognize and accept their responsibilities. The questions then become,
how shall we determine whether administrators have exercised
good judgment? By what criteria might the appropriateness of administrative judgment be assessed?
3.

Balance

Public administrators, as has been shown, have multiple principals whose direction may be less than definitive. These realities
argue for a process of balancing contending interests, what Kenneth Davis calls "a democratic element,

'284

in the exercise of ad-

ministrative judgment. Administrators, argues Morstein-Marx,
should "give careful thought to the legislative balance of power,
the enunciated or anticipated preferences of the chief executive,
and the probabilities of public reactions. Ideally, political and administrative thinking should blend into a joint process.

'2 5

Said

Arthur Macmahon, "we may say of legislation generally that the
pressures in a pragmatic democracy, sanctioned by majorities and
guided by an instinct for equilibrium, are constantly writing a kind
282. SCHUYLER C. WALLACE, FEDERAL DEPARTMENTALIZATION:
THEORIES OF ORGANIZATION 89 (1941).

A

CRITIQUE OF

283. Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretationin the Administrative State, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 593 (1985). Paul Appleby reaches a similar conclusion from a different premise. He states, "[a] governmental organization characterized by internal considerateness is likely to be more considerate of citizens with which it deals than is a
governmental agency conducted within itself on authoritarian lines." APPLEBY, supra
note 205, at 97.
284. DAVIS, supra note 125, at 24.
285. Fritz Morstein Marx, The Social Function of Public Administration, in ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 89-109, 102 (Fritz Morstein Marx ed., 2d ed.
1959).
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of balancing bias into one law or another. '286 The act of striking a
balance is termed "adjustive activity" by Emmette Redford: "In
the concept of administration as adjustive activity, administration is
an extension of the political process of adjustment among
interests.

287

To achieve balance, Marshall Dimock has argued,
The law related to the subject must, of course, be considered,
but in addition the economic situation, the pressure of political
parties, and vested interests must be given consideration [as
they constitute] influences acting upon the actual administration
of government ....There is a great deal of repetition, parallel-

ism, and uniformity in the conduct of public business.288
"Public administration," he continues,

is not merely an inanimate machine, unthinkingly performing
the work of government. If public administration is concerned
with the problems of government, it is also by the same token
interested in fulfilling the ends and objectives of the state.
Hence, public administration, in its larger sense, involves those
considerations once encompassed by the
term political econ289
omy. Public administration is planning.
Thus, in all but the most routine tasks, there is no "one right
answer" to the problems with which administrators must deal.
They must strike a balance among competing interests, values, and
interpretations of fact.29 ° The real agenda of public management,
say Ott, Hyde and Shafritz, is "balancing political, economic, and
social concerns for equity, ethics, and fairness, as well as integrat-

286. Arthur W. Macmahon, Specialization and the Public Interest, inDEMOCRACY
IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION 37-54

(0. B. Conaway, Jr. ed., 1955).

287. REDFORD, supra note 278, at 188. He further notes, "usually, as Herring recognized, policy making will go beyond mere identification and involve some balancing
of group interests involved " Id. at 111. He quotes Arthur Macmahon as having referred to the fact that much of our legislation shows a 'balancing bias' and that administrators must carry out such legislation." Macmahon, supra note 286, at 47.
288. Dimock, supra note 168, at 8, 9.
289. Id. at 11-12. Later, Morstein Marx argued that administration requires "a
profitable blend of judgments, political and professional, staff and line, general and
special." MORSTEIN-MAIX, supra note 144, at 286.
290. Carl Friedrich, noting that "responsibility is measured in terms of service to
interests determined by the preferences" of others and that interests will differ, expressed the challenge as follows: "How are we, then, to solve this problem of holding
the several interests together and giving them a common direction, of integrating
them into a more or less consistent whole?" Friedrich, supra note 188, at 398.
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ing perspectives for bettering 'the public good' in complex, highly
diverse, competitive, and inequitable environments." 2 91
4. Rationality
Marshall Dimock referred to discretion as "the liberty to decide
between alternatives,"292 i.e., as tantamount to, or as requiring, rationality. To be responsible, judgment as between alternatives necessarily must be logical or rational as well as balanced. 293 A
rational action is one that is logical in the following sense: the relationship between goals and the means for achieving them in the
mind of the manager corresponds to the relationship between goals
and means for achieving them in reality (or as might be confirmed
by independent analysis).2 94
How might decisions be reached in order for them to be considered rational? A rational choice among alternatives reflects a careful consideration of objectives, the means for achieving them, and
the relative merits of those means. In other words, rational decision-making is done by "systematizing the process of securing and
sifting relevant information so that the factors involved in arriving
at a policy decision can be stated and the consequences of alterna'295
tives can get analyzed and balanced.
Due to the strictures placed on rationality in the study of economics, rationality in human affairs has been widely construed, primarily by its denigrators, as requiring quite unrealistic information
291. PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: THE ESSENTIAL READINGS XVi (J. Steven Ott, Albert
C. Hyde & Jay M. Shafritz eds., 1991). Adds Pendelton Herring, "it is clear that the
official must balance the interests of the conflicting groups before him." HERRING,
supra note 184, at 23.
292. Dimock, supra note 144, at 46.
293. Rationality has numerous aspects or meanings: the pursuit of purpose (administration itself is a means to an end); source of cohesion (as opposed to "countless
clusters of personal influence"); application of knowledge; application of reason; as a

gatherer of intelligence. Morstein Marx concedes that "ultimately, [rationality] is
controlled by its conscious premises or its unconscious predispositions." Id. at 40. He
cites as examples the British and French administrations and any colonial administration. But he also sees institutionalized rationality as "putting proposed policy to the
acid test of cause-and-effect relationships." Id. at 42.
294. See RAYMOND ARON, 2 MAIN CURRENTS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT 121,

220 (1999).
295. Avery Leiserson & Fritz Morstein Marx, The Study of Public Administration,
in ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 23-48, 46 (Fritz Morstein Marx ed., 2d ed.
1959). Early 20th century administrative theorists saw the objective of administration
as efficiency defined not as reducing the expense of government, the view prevalent in
legislatures, but as "a measure of the quality of work of the administrative system."
PERI E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY: COMPREHENSIVE REORGANIZATION PLANNING, 1905-1996, at 20 (1998).
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processing and computational capabilities. Marshall Dimock, fore-

shadowing the policy analysis movement, identified an alternative
approach he called "theory and invention." Its purpose "is largely
to uncover false assumptions and to invent new ideas and ways of
doing things for the administrator. '296 Later, Carl Friedrich argued
that we have a right to call a policy irresponsible, i.e., irrational, "if
it can be shown that it was adopted without proper regard to the
existing sum7 of human knowledge concerning the technical issues
29
involved.

Rationality in the context of public management refers to institutional, or collective, rationality, rather than individual rationality,
because, as economist Kenneth Arrow has shown, the rational

preferences of individuals, such as an organization's employees,
cannot be aggregated into rational group choices. 298 The policy
analysis approach to rationality enables the public manager to cope
responsibly with what the philosopher Nicholas Rescher has called

"the predicament of reason," or "the irresolvable tension between
the demands of rationality and its practical possibilities" owing to

the inadequacy of available information and, one might add, the
incompatibility of alternatives.2

99

"It is the course of reason,"

Rescher argues, "to aim at the absolute best, but nevertheless to
settle for the best that is realistically available in the existing circumstances. ''3 ° And we must recognize the discomfiting fact that

"the best we can do under the circumstances may eventuate as
quite the wrong thing. "301
296. Marshall E. Dimock, The Meaning And Scope Of Public Administration, in
THE FRONTIERS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

1-12 (J. Gaus, L. White & M. Dimock

eds., 1936).
297. Friedrich, supra note 160, at 12. Dwight Waldo characterizes scientific management more reasonably as "the substitution of the laws of situations for individual
authority, guess and whim." WALDO, supra note 154, at 52.
298. This finding is known as the Arrow Impossibility Theorem. See KENNETH J.
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION

(1974). For James Q. Wilson, "[tihere is not one

bureaucracy problem, there are several, and the solution to each is in some degree
incompatible with the solution to every other." James Q. Wilson, The Bureaucracy

Problem, 6 PUB. INT. 4 (1967).
299. NICHOLAS RESCHER, COMPLEXITY: A

PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW

169 (1998).

300. Id. at 169.
301. Id. Douglas Besharov, former New York City prosecutor, founding director of
the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, author of the official Commentaries
to the New York child welfare reform laws, which he helped draft, and a member of
New York City's Accountability Review Panel, said the following in an interview:
Q. Are a certain number of wrong decisions inevitable no matter how well
the system is working?
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Alternatives to a Precept of Managerial Responsibility

We argue that a precept of managerial responsibility incorporating the foregoing four dimensions of public management derived
from theory and practice will improve democratic governance and
that courts owe it deference in the interest of collective justice. But
are there alternatives to this particular avenue to better
government?

Numerous answers to this question might be suggested. Some
emphasize external considerations: rules and procedures were followed or duly appointed officials executed the will of the enacting

coalitions that created the agency's statutory framework. Others
emphasize internal considerations: expertise, i.e., an explicit normative standard of judgment, was applied or demonstrably qualified officials relied upon their intuition and experience in making
determinations." 2 Carl Friedrich identified five mechanisms for
enforcing administrative responsibility in the modern state: promotional measures that rely on the psychology of encouragement; disciplinary measures that rely on the psychology of discouragement;
financial measures of control and audit of expenditures, based on
"the rule of anticipated reactions"; judicial measures based on civil
and criminal law; and the spirit of craftsmanship or sound professionalism, "of a thing well done," which refers to standards of ob-

jective achievement" or "the necessity of justifying the choice" to
one's professional peers.30 3
Reflecting both the directive and adjustive aspects of public
management, this enumeration of possible solutions is reasonable.
However, it begs the question of the formal role of the courts in
A. Yes. This is not like heart surgery where there are objective standards.
It's very hard to make the right decision all the time. Sometimes facts go
undiscovered. Sometimes conditions change, and it's impossible to expect
that every decision caseworkers and agencies make will be absolutely right.
Part of the test is: "Was the decision correct given what was known or should
have been known at the time?"
Douglas Besharov, Why the System Fails Abused Children, TRIAL March 1997.
Policy analysis, now widely practiced both formally and informally throughout government at all levels, is an approach to aiming at the best outcomes while at the same
time understanding what is realistically achievable under the circumstances. That is, it
is an element of institutional rationality and, as such, an aspect of competent
administration.
302. EDLEY, supra note 135, at 3 refers to three paradigmatic methods of decision
making: adjudicatory fairness, politics, and scientific expertise.
303. FRIEDRICH, supra note 188, at 402, 412. Concerning the fifth standard, that of
professionalism, he draws the analogy to the judiciary: "judges have to account for
their action in terms of a rationalized and previously established set of rules." Id. at
412.
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assessing managerial responsibility when confronting apparent
conflicts between individual and collective justice. Some combination of these various mechanisms is almost always evident. The
question is whether their use coheres into a precept of managerial
responsibility sufficiently compelling to warrant judicial deference.
Knott and Miller suggest structural solutions to the problem of
administrative responsibility. They call attention to proposals by
Martin Landau,3 °4 Jonathan Bendor, °5 and Vincent Ostrom, °6
who argue, respectively, for redundancy, competition, and Madisonian checks and balances. Knott and Miller conclude, however,
that "there is no structure whose neutrality, expertness, or other
characteristics can automatically legitimate the policy choices it
makes .... an institution is justified by its outcomes, rather than
the other way around."30 7 Judging the responsibility of public management by its outcomes in the case of human service agencies,
however, fails to comprehend the uncertainties inherent in working
with human beings and inappropriately assigns the risks associated
with achieving both individual and collective justice. Such a basis
for judgment invites the kinds of abuses of judicial intervention
enumerated above and a risk adverse management that is inimical
to the elements of managerial responsibility incorporated in our
precept.
Finally, Gerald Garvey suggests a number of measures, including
the "release of creativity" and the ideas of the human relations
school and, as well, mobilizing economic incentives by emphasizing
the notion of citizen as customer and embracing new public management notions of market-like discipline.30 8 Again, the content of
directive activity may take many different forms that are appropriately judged using political criteria. None would properly substitute for judicial intervention, however, and the question of the role
of the courts remains.
304. Martin Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplicationand
Overlap, 29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346 (1969).
305. JONATHAN BENDOR, PARALLEL SYSTEMS: REDUNDANCY IN GOVERNMENT

(1985).
306. VINCENT OSTROM, THE INTELLECTUAL CRISIS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
(1973).
307. KNOTr & MILLER, supra note 162, at 274.
308. In a review of recent publications, James D. Carroll characterizes "new public
management" as "reducing and deregulating bureaucracy, using market mechanisms
and simulated markets to conduct government action, devolving responsibility downward and outward in organizations, increasing productivity, energizing agencies and
empowering employees to pursue results, improving quality, and satisfying customers." James D. Carroll, Book Review, 28 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 402 (1998).
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CONCLUSION

Despite a century of efforts to overcome the confusion of roles
inherent in the modern administrative state, tensions persist. The
question of administrative discretion, of judges deferring to managerial expertise and professionalism, is still unsettled. However
much courts and legislatures might wish otherwise, public managers need judicial deference to fulfill legislative mandates.
Institutional reform remedies are presently based on the premise
that the inflexible application of rules and standards to every act an
administration performs will produce a more equitable result-one
that comports with constitutional rights-than deference within an
institutional framework. We argue that this premise is incorrect.
Confronting this inconvenience requires that legislators and judges
recognize that responsibility requires the authority to act, that authority requires discretion in order that reliability and consistency
be assured, and that discretion requires a precept of managerial
responsibility.
Our objective is to strengthen the judicial check on public management in human services agencies by clarifying and relocating it
in a way that encourages responsible administration. We do not
pretend to deal with absolute solutions. We recognize that the attitude of courts toward the freedom of the public administration varies from time to time, jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and with the
subject matter concerned. °9 Moreover, public officials remain
subject to sanction with respect to all the actions they take in conformity to the precept of managerial competence. An official may
strike a balance that is offensive to the public or to the legislature.
Though rational, i.e., disinterested and based on analysis, the administrator's reasons might be regarded by the public or legislators
as unconvincing and, thus, invite reprisals. As we have stressed,
there is no one right answer to the complex questions of governance, and reasonable legislators, stakeholders, and judges may well
differ on the manager's exercise of responsibility.
Our position is that administering reprisals in the case of an errantly struck balance or unconvincing argument is the dominion of
the legislature, not the courts. It is the responsibility of the courts
to determine whether managers have acted responsibly, i.e., have
been demonstrably accountable, balanced, and rational in their decisions and actions. Our argument amounts to providing principled
309. WHITE, supra note 103, at 446 (citing W. H. Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals, 36 HARV. L. REV. 405, 405-25, 583-92 (1922-23)).
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latitude for the public manager to frame actions in a manner that
deserves the approbation of the courts.
We concede that this argument is not politically neutral. In arguing the need for another kind of balance, that between formal procedures and discretion, Don K. Price noted:
[t]hose who wish to protect private interests against interference
will naturally , at least in the short run , want to tip the balance

in favor of more formalized procedures. Those who mainly wish
to accomplish broad social objectives and to integrate national
policy will generally want to tip it in favor of more administrative discretion.31°
Our argument here is not that the balance should be struck one
way rather than another, but instead that, in the case of complex
social legislation, such as that which seeks to protect children from
harm, the balance has already been struck by the legislature: accomplishing broad social objectives is the goal. Once the goal is
chosen, discretion in its pursuit is essential. The separate elements
of the precept of managerial responsibility are highly interdependent. Administration must at all times be accountable. Accountability requires good judgment, and good judgment depends in turn
on recognizing the need for balance among competing values, a
process that, to be accountable, must be rational.
Marisol Revisited
Though we believe our argument to be applicable more generally, we conclude by applying the precept of managerial responsibility to the Marisol case. 311 In our view, ACS fulfilled the precept
of managerial responsibility, exhibiting accountability, judgment,
balance, and rationality sufficient to sustain the conclusion that the
agency was well managed.
*ACS exhibited accountability. City officials, in direct response
to evidence of mismanagement under the old organization of
child welfare services, created a new agency under qualified
leadership. The new leaders immediately established an ongoing working relationship with the Mayor and his staff and with
other city agencies, placed priority on implementing statewide
management systems, established ongoing advisory relationships with both national and local leaders and experts in child
welfare, created an Accountability Review Panel to monitor
310. Price, supra note 138, at 482.
311. A fuller analysis of the specific attributes of the ACS Reform Plan appears in
supra note 8.

LYNN,
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case management, and instituted a system for monitoring agency
compliance with legislative and judicial mandates. New management information systems were utilized to ensure accountability to agency policy objectives among caseworkers and their
supervisors.
*ACS exhibited judgment. Agency leadership undertook a systematic and extensive program of initiatives covering all aspects
of agency operations and given expression in an agency Reform
Plan that became the blueprint for administration. Decisiveness
came to characterize agency management, e.g., a new management team was assembled, backlogs were eliminated, new personnel qualifications and training were initiated, additional case
workers were hired, and relationships with field offices and with
agency contractors were revamped.
*ACS exhibited balance. The agency Reform Plan established
priorities and timetables to guide agency resource allocation
among its myriad functions and activities. Senior management
continually monitored implementation of the Plan and reported
on problems and accomplishments. Budgetary resources and
management effort were reallocated toward the highest priority
problems, e.g., personnel hiring and training, a new detention
center, and management information systems development.
*ACS exhibited rationality. Adherence to the Reform Plan replaced ad hoc, crisis-oriented, and pressure-driven management.
The new management information systems were used to create
performance indicators, and the publication of comparative data
on field offices was used as a management tool, enabling senior
managers at headquarters and in borough offices to identify
trends, ask questions, and engage in focused trouble-shooting.
Information from case reviews was used to establish best practice guidelines that were beginning to be incorporated into training and supervision.

Though the Reform Plan could not, because no plan could, produce mistake-free administration, we believe that it would have,
and indeed already had, improved the child welfare environment in
New York City. Because the federal court refused to abstain, we
cannot know precisely what this policy innovation might have
achieved. We do know that from the date that the lawsuit was filed
until Judge Ward approved the settlement agreement, there were
two years of steady improvements in child welfare administration.
In the future, responsible reform programs originating in the administration should be allowed to prove themselves before being
displaced by a consent decree, settlement agreement, or structural
injunction.

